Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

Kelly F. Pearson v. Kimberlee Y. Pearson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven H. Gunn; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee; Kellie F. Williams;
Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Intervenor/Appellee.
Paige Bigelow; Kruse, Landa, Maycock & Ricks; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pearson v. Pearson, No. 20040677 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5161

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KELLY F. PEARSON,
Petitioner/Appellant,

vs.
KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON,
Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20040677-CA

PETER D. THANOS,
Intervenor/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

STEVEN H. GUNN (1272)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS (3493)
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Attorney for Intervenor / Appellee
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-1162

PAIGE BIGELOW (6493)
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellant
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 45561
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561

Telephone: (801) 531-7090

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

FEB - 7 2005

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KELLY F. PEARSON,
Petitioner/Appellant,

vs.
KIMBERLEE Y.PEARSON,
Respondent/Appellee.

PETER r

2004067" CA

XIMUCD,

ntervenor/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

STEVEN H. G U N N ( i ^ 2 )
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
l . j . Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS (3493)
CORPORON& WILLIAMS
Attorney for Intervenor / Appellee
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-1162

PAIGE BIGELOW (6493)
KRUSE, LANDA, MAYCOCK & RICKS
Attorney for Petitioner / Appellant
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 45561
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561
Telephone: (801^31-7090

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

Nature of the Case

2

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below

2

Statement of Facts

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

20

ARGUMENT

21

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INTERVENOR STANDING TO
DISESTABLISH PETITIONER AS ZACHARY'S LEGAL FATHER

21

A.

Schoolcraft Analysis

21

B.

Constitutional Analysis

31

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

47

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION
AGAINST PETITIONER IN HIS CLAIM FOR CUSTODY OF ZACHARY

52

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTERVENOR CUSTODY
RIGHTS IN NICHOLAS

59

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT PRIMARY
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF NICHOLAS, AND RESPONDENT AND
INTERVENOR JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY AND PRIMARY PHYSICAL
CUSTODY OF ZACHARY

59

ii

A.

B.

C.

D.

The Court's Designation of Respondent as Primary Physical Custodian
of Nicholas is Inconsistent With Its Award of 50/50 Physical Custody to
Petitioner and Respondent and Should be Vacated

60

The Court's Findings are Legally Insufficient to Support its Award of
Primary Physical Custody of Nicholas to Respondent

61

1.

Finding of Fact No. 38

.......66

2.

Finding of Fact No. 39

67

3.

Finding of Fact No. 40

67

4.

Finding of Fact No. 41

69

5.

Finding of Fact No. 42

69

6.

Finding of Fact No. 46

......71

The Findings of Fact are Legally Insufficient to Support the Court's
Award of Joint Legal and Primary Physical Custody of Zachary to
Intervenor and Respondent

73

The Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Making Findings Regarding Key
Factors Relative to the Children's Best Interests in this Case

74

CONCLUSION

74

ADDENDUM: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Achumba v. Neustein. 793 So. 2d 1013,1021 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001)

36

Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1996)

55

Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, fl13,65 P.3d 1134
Davis v. LaBrec. 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001)

1,46
54, 55

Dawn D. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. 4th 932,940 (Cal. 1998)...37,39,45
Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

64

Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Privette, 617 So. 2d 305,309 n.7 (Fla. 1993)
36
Dipaolo v. Cugini, 811 A.2d 1053 (Super. Ct. Pa. 2002)

51

F.B.V.A.L.G.. 795 A.2d 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)

57

Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841, 846 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000)

36

G.F.C. v. S.G. and D.G.. 686 So. 2d 1382,1385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997)

31

Ghrist v. Fricks, 465 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)

40

Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978)
Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959)

35,40,56, 59
21,22

Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, fl 21,989 P.2d 491
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982)
In re Adoption of P.. 252 P.2d 223 (Utah 1953)

iv

2
52, 53, 54,58,61
35

In re Adoption of F., 488 P.2d 130,134 (Utah 1971)

28

In re Bridget R.. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)

37

In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855,856 (1981)

32

In re H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

53

In re J.M. & N.P.. 940 P.2d 527, 539 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

28

In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982)

31, 32, 33

In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189,195 (Tex. 1994)

44

In re Marriage of Burgess. 13 Cal. 4th 25,45 n.7 (S. Ct.1996)

71

In re Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)

24, 25,37,46

In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989)

25

In re Marriage of Sleeper, 929 P.2d 1028,1029-30 (Or. Ct. App. 1996)

51

In re S.A., 2001 UT App 307. 37 P.3d 1166

35

In re Shocklev, 123 S.W.3d 642(Tex. Ct. App. 2003)

51

In re. D.B.S., 888 P.2d 875,887 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995)
Jensen v. Jensen, 775 P.2d 436,438 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979)
Kishoaugh v. Kishpaugh. 745 P.2d 1248,1250 (Utah 1987)

40,43
2
63
..53

Kristen P. v. Stephen P., N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (App. Piv. 2001)

50

Kusiorv. Silver, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960)

25

Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719,727 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

71

V

Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983)

34,39,43,44

Lopes v. Lopes. 518 P.2d 687,691 n.3 (Utah 1974)

42

Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30, U12,996 P.2d 1043

1

Merriam v. Merriam. 799 P.2d 1172,1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

64

Michael H. v. Gerald P.. 491 U.S. 110,129 (1989)

38, 39,40,41,44

Moss v. Moss. CA99-1312 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000)
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)

56
;.

41

Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services. Inc.. 1999 UT 100

48

Olwell v. Clark. 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982)

47

Pennington v. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985)

63,64

Pusev v. Pusev. 728 P.2d 117,120 (Utah 1986)

61

Randv A.J, v. Norma I.J.. 677 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 2004)

51

Reagan Outdoor Adv.. Inc. v. Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984)

47

Richard W. v. Roberta Y.. 658 N.Y.S.2d 506,506-07 (App. Div. 1997)

51

S.D.v.A.G.andJ.G.. 764 So. 2d 807,810 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000

23

Santoskv v. Kramer. 455 U.S. 745 (1982)

36

Searle v. Searle. 2001 UT App 367, n.11, 38 P.3d 307
See In re H.R.V.. 906 P.2d 913,915 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
Snyder v. Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)
StatelnreJ.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990)

35,57
1
38
4, 22, 23,26,27,42

vi

State in re Walter B.. 577 P.2d 119,124 (Utah 1978)

32

State v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676,680 (Utah 1997)

48

Susan H. v. Jack S.. 30 Cal. App. 4«h 1435,1442-1443 (1994)

24

Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Services, 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990)

45

Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 407 P.2d 685,692 n.5 (Utah 1965)

25

Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428,434 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

60

Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984)
Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205,231-233 (1972)

28,37
34

Statutes
Uniform Parentage Act (2002)

52

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2

38

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10 (2004)

61,69

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2)

60

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.1(d)

60

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2004)

28

Utah Code Ann. §78-30-4.12(e)

43

Other Authorities
Black's Law Dictionary, at 534 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983)

vii

34

Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 17-20

25

S.B. 14

52

Unif. Parentage Act § 608 (2002), 37 Fam. Law Q. 5 (Spring 2002)

52

Rules
Rule 4-903 of the Utah R. of Judical Admin

61,62

Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A)

47

Utah R. Civ. P. 56

47

Constitutional Provisions
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Article I, § 25

31

viii

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in granting intervenor standing to challenge the
paternity of the child Zachary born during petitioner and respondent's marriage. Standing is
a legal issue and is reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court. Campbell
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 2001 UT 89, ^ 13,65 P.3d 1134. This issue was
preserved by petitioner's memoranda opposing intervener's intervention (R.83, R.222 &
R.453).
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying petitioner's motion for summary
judgment to bar respondent and intervenor from challenging Zachary's paternity on grounds
of equitable estoppel. The trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness, and no deference is accorded the trial court's conclusions of law.
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30,1J 12,996 P.2d 1043. This issue was preserved by
petitioner's motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum (R.1361, R.1302).
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that respondent benefits from the
parental presumption on her claim for custody of Zachary against petitioner. The trial
court's determination of what legal standard to apply in a custody case is reviewed for
correctness, with no deference given to the trial court. See In re H.R.V., 906 P.2d 913,915
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This issue was preserved by petitioner's trial brief (R.2177).
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Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred in awarding intervenor custody rights in
Nicholas, respondent primary physical custody of Nicholas, and respondent and intervenor
joint legal custody and primary physical custody of Zachary. The trial court's custody
awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290,
U 21,989 P.2d 491. However, the trial court's discretion in custody matters must be
exercised within the confines of the legal standards set by appellate courts, and the facts
and reasons for the court's decision must be supported by legally adequate findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Jensen v. Jensen. 775 P.2d 436,438 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The
issue of custody was preserved by petitioner's trial brief (R.2177).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third District Court establishing paternity
of a child of the marriage in a third party, and entering orders regarding custody, child
support, alimony, and attorney fees.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below
Petitioner commenced divorce proceedings in December 2000 (R.1). Intervenor
moved to intervene in the proceedings on January 23,2001, claiming to be the biological
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father of Zachary, one of the uinu.-ui.L...
respondent filed a motion iucjut'iiliiiii II ul IIHIIIOIN'I fir • Iprlarnrl tn be not the father of
t.duiji,

i'""i

i

i"

iqhta Hfu | in it tn 11| ii irary custody of both children of the

marriage be awarded to her (P. 3/,. , ~

_ rr .sed both motions and requested that

temporary custody of the children be awarded to him (R cex
hearing before Commissioner Michael ^ ,.. j . ^ «;,; uu„.,
At the hearing, respondent attem, •.-.
^LILIK-H'II

I

i clil

Iiiprtpd ' "

-iree motions came on for
.
'

'•

i).
-winner was not

"•{ i_uiu iviaiionoid's Rule, which

objections were sustained. In the absence of any competent evidence of petitioner's
nonpaternity, respondent stipulated that custody should continue as it had since the (
separation, namely, upon a 50/50 access schedule w,

14.4,

, ne stipulate

>'

ds dtxe^lbJ

by the court and reduced to ordei (k, I JJ)
ij11• 11 I 'mil mil i'I'lnn h in'wr-dhi i IIIMIMIII tnintervene(R.165), which
petition"! ar^m exposed (R.222). The motion was heard August 30, 2001 (R.248).
Commissioner Evans found that intervenor had not acknowledged his paternity ot Zachary
for more than two years, though he was aware of and believed himsen
biological father, and that intervenor Kepi

. . _j>

;

•

i
7

other:

arha-v,n be regarded as petitioner's

son and to become closely bonded with petitioner during critical stages of Zachary's
development. Commissioner Evans further found that intervenor had not had substantial

3

contact with Zachary prior to the initiation of the litigation, that he had not lived with Zachary
in the same household or established a parent-child bond with Zachary, that he was
completely absent from Zachary's life for the first year and a half and had only incidental
contact with him thereafter, that during intervener's absence Zachary had developed critical
bonds with his primary caregivers, petitioner and respondent, and that to permit intervenor
to be introduced as Zachary's father would be disruptive to the child's stability.
Commissioner Evans concluded that intervenor did not have standing to challenge the
presumption of paternity in favor of petitioner and that he did not have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in establishing his paternity of Zachary. The Commissioner's
findings and recommendation were subsequently reduced to order (R.671). Intervenor and
respondent objected (R.257, R.400).
The trial court heard argument on intervener's and respondent's objections on
December 3,2001 (R.684). After taking the matter under advisement, the court in a
telephone conference indicated that it felt the issue was governed by the case of State In re
J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), and that the court needed additional information to
adequately address the policy considerations set forth in that case. Therefore, the court
appointed Dr. Jill Sanders "to provide the court with an independent 'Schoolcraft evaluation
(R.728).'"
Dr. Sanders submitted her "Schoolcraft evaluation" on May 13,2002 (Ex.l-2). She
stated in the report that "Kelly Pearson functioned as Zachary's father prior to and following
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his birth in September 1999

Zachary identifies

••.....-....

is secure, strong and health)

'"•"> intervener's contact
, and that Zachary identifies Peter as

"Peter'

She stated that she "found no information to suggest that Peter's involvement

in Zachary's life is a disruption to Zachary's normal and positive development K, .... ,
that "[t]here is no research that I am aware ui iiidi o ^ y c o ^ navmy i
r

figures has a detrimental impac

hanos is

* ""-ciliated that "psychologically speaking, some
relationship between a biological parent and their child is necessary for the child's normal
development." jd. In summary, she opined: "From a developmental and psychological
perspective, Zachary's functioning is not inherently disrupted by Peter's involvement and
Peter's relationship with Zachary.. . . ^ u . ^ ! ,

...-

development." Id dl '3.
11| II in n TPIVII it 11 ii ' n mders' report, petitioner requested that Dr. Sanders address
the impact on Zachary of a disruption in mo established parent-child relationship between
petitioner and Zachary, which she had not done • -n. .oner also requestea uu., _

. • .-.- •

address Zachary's present ability to underbid

- the

relevanu
teleph

•* *^

^.^n^r^

--^Quested a

inference with the court, which was held May 28, 2002 (R.847). The court

permitted petitioner to outline his concerns in a letter to the court, which he did (R.876). Dr.
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Sanders responded with a letter stating that she intended to address the issues raised by
petitioner in the custody evaluation and did not deem it necessary to address them in the
"Schoolcraft evaluation" (Ex. 1-3).
Meanwhile, respondent filed a motion to bifurcate the divorce and to terminate her
marriage to petitioner, which was granted. The court entered a decree of divorce dissolving
petitioner and respondent's marriage on June 21,2002 (R.855).
The district court subsequently requested Dr. Sanders to address the issues raised
by petitioner. Dr. Sanders did so by letter dated August 26,2002 (Ex. I-4). In this letter, Dr.
Sanders stated: "Children's reactions to severely restricted or complete loss of contact with
a loved and trusted caregiver vary dramatically from child to child. It is impossible to predict
any child's specific response to such a disruption. Reactions may range from mild and
transient symptoms of grief or depression to severe mood and behavior disruption including
self-destructive behaviors. Obviously the way to protect Zachary from additional disruption
is to maintain his relationship with Mr. Pearson." Id. at 2. She went on to state: "I do not
believe Zachary has 'lost' his relationship with Mr. Pearson. To the contrary, their
relationship is a strong and positive parent-child attachment. Mr. Pearson's actual time with
Zachary was disrupted by the separation but has been stable and significant for more than
two years [since respondent left the marital home]. There is no basis to believe that further
disruption to the relationship between Zachary and Mr. Pearson is intrinsically linked to Mr.
Thanos' presence in Zachary's life." Id. at 2-3. Finally, Dr. Sanders stated that "Zachary's
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cognitive ability at the age on;;,, . ^ .HU'jibU'

••• •

relationship. .
unlikely

'

^-e relationships is

"h impact on Zachary for quite some time. What Zachary currently

understands is that he has a loving relationship with Mr. Pearson, whom he considers his
father and a loving relationship with Mr. T f imos, whom he considers an additional
caregiver." Id. at 3. Sheendedwitnasiuu,!,*,,,^.^:^;; ,
handle zachary's intellectual un<••
--'—•

.•

nrtms

-• »• -'qtionship ••• " * • - ~ r i ' wavthat
IP adopted child's circumstances." Id.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion requesting that the court set the matter for
evidentiary hearing (R.869). In a telephone scheduling conference >=-. -

..•

,, <_uu2,

the court summarily denied petitioner's request and set the nidllei lui out..' limn oi.il
argument Octobei
vhich no evidence was taken, the court
granted intervener's motion to intervene (R.89*i,

>...yi, conclusions and an order were

signed over petitioner's objection on November 7, 2002 (R.933, R.975, R.971).
The following week, intervenor filed a motion fo. partial summary judgment
requesting that he be declared "llu: l/iulinjn .il ml ii.ihif.il l.illi.-i n\ ?;\r\v\\y Andi'pw Prarson
(R 98! n

n HI >n/i 'in II nil'i I hh affidavit in support of the motion, attaching genetic test results

' alleging sexual relations with respondent (R.1000). Intervenor did not allege that it was
in Zachary's best interests for petitioner to be disestablished as Zachary's legal father and
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made no argument or reference to Zachary's best interests, except to state that "issues in
regard to standing have already been addressed by this court and need not be readdressed
in this context as they are the law of the case (R.992, at 5)."
Petitioner objected to the admissibility of the genetic test results attached to
intervener's affidavit and moved to strike the report (R.1298). Thereafter, petitioner filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that intervenor and respondent
were equitably estopped from challenging Zachary's paternity (R.1361, R.1302). Petitioner
also filed a memorandum responding to intervener's memorandum arguing, inter alia, that
paternity should not be established absent a best interests hearing (R.1302). Intervenor
and respondent filed separate memoranda responsive to petitioner's motion for summary
judgment, each claiming, inter alia, that Zachary's best interests mandated that intervenor
be declared Zachary's father (R.1376, R.1427).
Petitioner filed a reply (R.1598) and the affidavit of Douglas Goldsmith, Ph.D.
(R.1592), disputing the claim that Zachary's best interests mandated that intervenor be
declared Zachary's father. Dr. Goldsmith noted that the parent-child relationship involves a
unique empathy between parent and child that develops most crucially between 9 months
and 15 months of age, and that by the age of 18 months, a child has a fully formed
conception of who his parents are. Id. at 3. Dr. Goldsmith took particular issue with Dr.
Sanders' opinion that it is necessary for a child's normal development to have a relationship
with his biological parents, stating, rather, that it is crucial to the child's normal development
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to have a healthy and undisrupted relationship with his parent, who is defined as the person
with whom ,!,ov.;

-

iild relationship '-1 i i ^ .

Inlfiveii','i'\ iiK'li"ii I'M- summary

it, petitioner's cross-motion for summary

judgment, and petitioner's objection to the admissibility of the genetic test results were set
for oral argument March 5,2003 (R.16581
advisement and on Marc

^UuJ ibbUcu

Ari

HO

"r argument, the court took the matter,
I K i l l IVJ * i

.

I '

ne coun grantee .

^

-•* T
1

• -•- t and objection to the admissibility of the genetic

In subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law entered over
petitioner's objection (R.1684, R.1723), the court concluded that intervenor had established
his paternity by proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that the presumpuu

s

Zachary's father had therefore bee,. ...

' •"
' ^ " n n e based upon ho

i

established that it was in Zachary's best interests to permit intervenor to intervene, and th. il
the court's findings and order were the law of the case. Id. at 19. With respect to
petitioner's motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the doctrii
estoppel is inapplicable to the I

>.

1
U

P issues of custody, alimony and

attorney fees. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court took the matter under
advisement, subsequently issuing written findings of fact (R. 2434) and entering a
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supplemental decree of divorce (R.2503). The court applied the parental presumption
against petitioner, denied him legal custody rights in Zachary, awarded primary custody of
Zachary to respondent and intervenor, awarded primary custody of Nicholas to respondent,
and granted respondent's request to relocate with both children to the State of Oregon. At
the same time, the court found that it was in the children's best interests that there be a
"joint physical custody arrangement" between the petitioner on the one hand, and
respondent and intervenor on the other, consisting of a 50-50 custody schedule for
Nicholas, and a somewhat less than 50-50 physical custody schedule for Zachary. The
schedule was made contingent upon petitioner relocating to Oreogn. The court awarded no
child support, alimony or attorney fees.
Statement of Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on August 17,1992
(R.2434, at 2, U 1 ; R.2532, at 388:24). They met while both students at the MBA school at
Brigham Young University (R.2532, at 387:14) and married after completing their first year.
Id. at 389:1-12. Upon graduating in April of 1993, they both obtained jobs with HewlettPackard in Corvallis, Oregon, and moved there in June of 1993. id. 390:1-5.
Respondent quickly advanced in the company and was promoted to a management
position approximately 18 months later, id- 391:17 — 392:21. Over the next few years her
responsibilities continued to increase. Id. 394:12 - 395:19.
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The parties' first son, Nicholas, was born July 6,1997 (R.2434, at 2, U1). By this
time, respondent had risen to the position of joint fab manager (R.2532, at 395:20). She
worked long hours, sometimes until 3:00 a.m. and on weekends. Id. 394:12 - 396:4. She
did not change her work habits after Nicholas's birth, and frequently was at work by 8:00
a.m., not returning until 7:00 p.m. and sometimes later, 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. ]d. 396:18 398:11. She also worked on her days off during the week and on weekends. Id.
Conversely, petitioner made substantial changes in his work schedule and habits to
accommodate Nicholas's birth, jd. 396:5 - 399:7. He switched to a four-day work week,
did not work weekends, and did not work on his days off. He maintained a regular 40-hour
work week and took care of Nicholas when he was not working. Id. Petitioner was more
involved in the care of Nicholas than respondent due to respondent's longer work hours,
greater church responsibilities, and her personal involvements outside the home (R.2533, at
462:19-463:3).
Due to a company consolidation, petitioner and respondent moved to Fort Collins,
Colorado on August 1,1998 and continued their employment there (R.2532, at 405:12).
Almost immediately upon moving to Fort Collins, a friend of respondent's began recruiting
her to work for a startup company in Salt Lake City, and petitioner and respondent began
discussing moving again. Id. at 407:12 - 408:6. Initially petitioner said no, but ultimately he
agreed to the move, in part because respondent's had been the greater salary. ]d. at
411:17-412:10.
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Respondent moved back to Salt Lake City in January 1999 to begin in her new
position, and petitioner followed over the next several months, transitioning from Fort Collins
to Salt Lake City. Nicholas stayed partly in Salt Lake City with respondent and partly in Fort
Collins with petitioner during this transition. Id. 412:11 -419:11 & Ex. P-11.
Unbeknownst to petitioner, commencing in 1996 and continuing thereafter through
Nicholas's birth and infancy, and Zachary's conception, respondent was involved ,
romantically with intervenor (R.2533, at 449:15; R.74, fflj 4-6). Intervenor was also married
at the time, and respondent and intervenor concealed their relationship from their respective
spouses (R.74, ffij 4-6). Respondent became pregnant towards the end of 1998, and in
January 1999 she told intervenor that she believed the child was his. Intervenor refused to
leave his wife and was unwilling to be known or recognized as the child's father (R.2535, at
961:14-962:25; R.74,1fH 4-6).
Thereafter, in late March 1999, respondent told petitioner of the pregnancy and of
the affair. She was four months pregnant by this time (R.2532, at 433:1; R.45, % 4). When
respondent told petitioner that she was pregnant with Zachary, she stated that she believed
intervenor was the child's biological father. Petitioner and respondent then discussed the
viability of their marriage, and respondent stated that she must decide whether to stay with
petitioner or leave. She asked petitioner whether, if she stayed, he would rear the child as
his own, making no distinction between him and their older son. Petitioner affirmed that he
would (R.2532, at 433:12 - 435:2; R.1570, H 4).
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The following day after this discussion took place, respondent told petitioner that
she had decided she would stay and make their marriage work (R.2532, at 435:3 - 436:8;
R.1570, fflj 4-6). From that point forward, until this litigation began, respondent repeatedly
confirmed to petitioner that she considered him to be the father of the child she was carrying
and that she would treat him as such in all respects (R.2533, at 450:8 - 452:8; R.1570,
fflf 4-6). Respondent expressed her fear that petitioner would not do so, and she repeatedly
asked petitioner for assurance that he would, which petitioner gave. Id. Respondent also
confided to petitioner that intervenor was unwilling to do anything that would reveal the
situation to his wife and that he wanted his belief that he was the child's biological father to
remain secret (R.2533, at 456:5-11; R.1570, U 4).
Relying on respondent's repeated representations and assurances, petitioner took
on the commitment of fatherhood and was as involved in the pregnancy as a father can be,
caring for and supporting respondent, attending all prenatal examinations with her, and
shouldering increased household duties to relieve respondent during the pregnancy
(R.2532, at 438:16 - 439:12; R.45, HU 5-8; R.1570,1f 9).
After Zachary's birth, respondent again resumed her full work schedule, leaving
petitioner with the lion's share of the responsibility for the children (R.457:2-6). She had by
this time been working for several months in the high management position for the startup
company by which she'd been recruited (R.2533, at 459:14). She worked long hours during
the week, typically leaving by 8:00 a.m. and not returning until 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. or later.

13

She also worked full days on Saturdays and 4 to 6 hours on Sundays, jd. at 457:1-15.
She was around even less for Zachary than she had been for Nicholas, jd. at 459:11-23.
Petitioner, on the other hand, consciously stepped back in his career in order to care for the
children (R.2532, at 431:1-17). He maintained a schedule of working 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Monday through Friday, and he did not work over-time or weekends (R.2533, at 457:20 458:4). He was involved in all aspects of the children's care. Id. at 458:7 - 459:23. He was
the one who took Nicholas to school in the morning, and he was the one who would arrive
home in the evening to relieve the nanny (R.2535, at 1071:11-15).
Respondent never acted inconsistently with her commitment to petitioner as
Zachary's father until this litigation began (R.2533, at 452:12). She listed petitioner as
Zachary's father on his birth certificate. The papers were filled out by both respondent and
petitioner together after Zachary was born (R.2533, at 453:14 & Ex. P-9; R. 1570,1J 9 &
1580). Petitioner chose Zachary's given name because respondent had chosen Nicholas's
given name (R.2533, at 454:4-10). Respondent and petitioner both agreed without question
that Zachary's surname would be "Pearson" (R. 1570, U10).
When Zachary was 6 weeks old both petitioner's family and respondent's family
gathered to bless Zachary as a member of the LDS Church. It was announced that
petitioner Kelly Pearson, Zachary's father, would give Zachary his name and a blessing, and
petitioner did so with members of both families participating. After the blessing, respondent
spoke from the pulpit and expressed the joy that she felt to welcome Zachary into their
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family. Respondent completed the form for Zachary's Blessing Certificate, signed by the
Pearson's bishop, stating that petitioner is Zachary's father and that he blessed him (R.
2533, at 454:11 -455:23 & Ex. P-10; R.1570, U11 & R.1581, R.1582). The Pearson's
church membership record confirms that Zachary was "bom in the covenant" and is
therefore sealed to petitioner as his father for all time and eternity (R.1570, H12 & R.1583).
Even after petitioner and respondent separated and respondent moved from the
Pearson's marital home in May 2000, she continued to act consistently with her repeated
representations to petitioner that she considered him to be Zachary's father. She left both
Zachary and Nicholas with petitioner while she established herself in a new residence, and
thereafter acquiesced in petitioner caring for both children in the home during the day while
she worked. She established jointly with petitioner a 50/50 time-sharing schedule to care
for Nicholas and Zachary, which continued through September of 2004, when the court's
newly imposed time sharing schedule took effect (R.2434, at 16, If 34.d; R. 1570, fl 13).
It was not until January 2001, when divorce proceedings commenced, that
respondent changed her position. At that time she filed a motion with the court asking that
the court declare that petitioner was not Zachary's father and that he had no rights of
custody or visitation in Zachary (R.32).
Nevertheless, while taking this position in court papers, respondent continued to
represent petitioner as Zachary's father in public forums and to acquiesce in his ongoing
assumption of the role of Zachary's father. At Zachary's pre-school, which Zachary started
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in the Fall of 2002, respondent listed Zachary's home phone as "Dad - 467-8923",
petitioner's home phone, and his grandparents as "Velda and Wayne", petitioner's parents
(R.1570,1f 15 & R.1587). Petitioner is listed as Zachary's father at work, at Zachary's
school, on the church records, and in this state's vital records (R.1570, U14 & R.1580-91).
Intervenor also acquiesced in petitioner's assumption of the role of Zachary's father.
Knowing of Zachary's existence before even petitioner did, and believing himself to be
Zachary's father from the time he learned of respondent's pregnancy in January 1999, he
allowed petitioner to assume that role for two full years, doing nothing to acknowledge his
paternity (R.2535, at 963:1; R.671, fl 9). He felt that he would be "Uncle Pete" to Zachary
rather than father, yet he acquiesced in that occurring (R.2535, at 964:8-16; R.2536, at
1302:21 -1303:21; R.449, at 2, fl 4). He kept his biological connection to Zachary hidden
from others, including his family members, until as late as August 2001 (R. 671, fl 9).
Despite his belief and knowledge that he was Zachary's biological father, intervenor allowed
Zachary to be regarded in every way as petitioner's son and to become closely bonded with
petitioner during critical stages of Zachary's development. ]d. Intervener's desire to keep
Zachary's parentage secret also resulted in minimal contact between Zachary and
intervenor during these critical stages (R.2434, at 19). During the first year of Zachary's life,
intervenor saw him twice, each time about an hour (R.2535, at 964:17-21). During the
second year of Zachary's life, until February 2001, he saw him two to three times (R.2535,
at 964:22-25; R.2434, at 4, P ) .
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On December 25,2000, intervener's wife died (R.2533, at 635:20). Beginning in
February 2001, intervenor began to have contact with Zachary and Nicholas during the
periods of time that the children were in respondent's custody (R.2434, at 4, H 9). Zachary
was seventeen months old by this time. The contact consisted of approximately the
equivalent of standard visitation for a noncustodial parent (R.2534, at 716:8). Intervenor
continued to live in Oregon through the time of trial (R.2434, at 4, ^ 8).
Nicholas and Zachary make no distinction between themselves in their relationship
with intervenor, identifying him as their step-father and calling him "Pete" (Ex. I-2, at 3;
R.2535, at 950). To both children, intervenor is a stepparent, not a parent (R.2534, at
711:17). Nor do Nicholas and Zachary make any distinction between themselves in their
relationship with petitioner, identifying him as their father and calling him "Dad" (Ex. I-2, at 3;
Ex. I-4, at 3; R.2434, at 19). Nicholas and Zachary's primary attachment figures are
petitioner and respondent (R.2534, at 715:11,716:18). They have a "secondary"
attachment to intervenor (R.2534, at 716:14).
In May 2001, a few months after the first court appearance in this case, respondent
voluntarily quit her executive position at the company where she had been working since
February 1999 and took a position as a contractor working approximately 80 to 85 hours per
month (R.2536, at 1155:3 -1157:14). Prior to changing positions, she was expected to
work 50 to 70 hours per week and keep minimum office hours of 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
each weekday (R.762, fl 16). She was also earning a salary of $135,000 per year, plus a
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bonus of $5,000 (R.1224:8-16). After changing positions, she filed a motion with the court
requesting that she be relieved of her child support obligation due to having experienced a
significant decrease in income (R.782, R.762, fl 15). Commissioner Evans denied the
motion, finding that because resondent's drop in income was voluntary, her support
obligation should not be decreased (R.848, U 8).
At the time of trial, respondent was employing a nanny to provide after-care for
Nicholas and Zachary consisting of, on average, 35 hours per month (Ex. R-9; R.2536, at
1204:6 -1207:10). This was for time that respondent had the boys with her at her home
(every other week) and the boys were not in school (R.2536, at 1262:4). Zachary attended
pre-school until 11:30 a.m., and Nicholas attended first grade until 3:00 p.m. at this time. Id.
at 1160:16-1161:12. Conversely, petitioner did not employ a nanny, and was able to care
for the boys personally in his home (R. 2535, at 494:21 - 495:18). He provided care on all
levels, cooking for them, taking them to school, helping them with homework, educating
them, playing with them, arranging play dates for them, seeing to their medical needs, and
participating in their school and extra-curricular activities (R.2533, at 493:1 - 494:20).
Respondent maintained a home in Salt Lake City through the time of trial (R.2434,
H 9), but began living partially with intervenor in July 2001, when they purchased a home
together in Oregon (R.2434, at 4,1J 8). Respondent was still married to petitioner at this
time. On June 21,2002, respondent obtained a bifurcated decree of divorce from petitioner
(R.855). Shortly thereafter, respondent and intervenor married (R.2434, at 4,K 7).
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At the time of trial, Zachary had lived in Salt Lake City his whole life, having been
born here, and Nicholas had lived here from the time he was approximately 19 months old
(R.2532, at 412:21 - 415:7). Nicholas was in first grade at Uintah Elementary and Zachary
was in pre-school at the Jewish Community Center. Id. 487:2-8. In a 4-week period of time
the boys would spend one extended weekend in Oregon at intervenor and respondent's
home there (R.2535, at 1074:5 -1075:13). They spent the rest of their time in Salt Lake
City, either at petitioner's home or respondent's home. Id.; R.2533, at 487:10-16. The
children enjoyed very close and loving relationships with both sets of grandparents, as well
as uncles, aunts, and cousins in Salt Lake City (R.485:8 - 487:1; R.2531 at 93:1 -100:18;
R.2531, at 182:5-187:18).
At trial, petitioner testified at length regarding why he did not wish to move to
Portland, including, primarily, that he felt that Salt Lake City was the best place for Nicholas
and Zachary due to the continuity of neighborhood, school and friends, the extensive family
network, and the lack of a support network for him in Portland, which could result in the
children losing him as a co-parent if he were unable to sustain himself there (R.2532, at
424:5 - 427:12). Additionally, he testified that he felt deeply concerned that respondent
might choose to move again, even if he did move to Portland. Id. at 427:13 - 429:23.
Nevertheless, he testified that he would be forced to follow if the court allowed respondent
to relocate the children because they were the most important thing to him. Id. at 430:23 431:22).
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Zachary and Nicholas have been raised together since birth and have a close,
loving relationship with one another. Until September 2004, when the court's new custody
schedule took effect, they had very seldom been separated from one another (R.27, fl 5).
They are the very best of friends (R. 2434, at 15, fl 34.b). At trial, respondent testified that
the time apart recommended by Dr. Sanders for the two boys was "more than she would
like to see." R.2536, at 1211:15-22.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting intervenor standing to establish his paternity of
Zachary in this divorce action. In doing so, the trial court did not adequately consider the
policies informing the presumption of legitimacy, including, prominently, the importance of
swiftly and permanently identifying those persons who will fulfill the parental role for children
- including marital children. Additionally, the trial court did not identify or weigh the
constitutional interests at stake in this controversy, which resulted in its erroneous
conclusion that intervener's rights in Zachary are constitutionally protected, in turn leading to
the court's over solicitousness of the relationship between intervenor and Zachary.
The trial court also erred in concluding that equitable estoppel is not applicable to bar
intervenor and respondent from litigating Zachary's paternity, based on the uncontroverted
evidence set forth in support of petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
With respect to custody, the trial court erred in concluding that respondent benefits
from the parental presumption vis-a-vis petitioner in her claim for custody of Zachary.
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Petitioner's legal relationship with Zachary (prior to disestablishment by the trial court)
combined with his in loco parentis status, qualify him as a parent to Zachary and entitle him
to compete for custody based on a best interests standard.
The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding primary physical custody of
Nicholas to respondent. The court's findings are internally inconsistent with respect to this
award, and legally insufficient to support it. Further, the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding custody rights in Nicholas to intervenor, who was not a contestant for custody of
Nicholas and did not overcome the parental presumption in favor of petitioner and
respondent. Additionally, the trial court erred in separating Nicholas and Zachary - an
award that flows from its improper application of the parental presumption against petitioner,
and not on best interests findings to support it. Finally, the trial court erred in failing to make
findings that are legislatively mandated and/or pertinent to the determination of the
children's best interests in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING INTERVENOR STANDING TO
DISESTABLISH PETITIONER AS ZACHARY'S LEGAL FATHER
A.

Schoolcraft Analysis

A husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times, been
protected by the presumption of legitimacy. In Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959),
the Utah Supreme Court noted that the presumption "is rooted in the realization of the
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importance of the integrity of the legally recognized family as the basic unit of society," id. at
762, and held: "The presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless the contrary is proved
beyond a reasonable doubt

The considerations favoring legitimacy render it desirable

as a matter of policy that the presumption should be accorded the same weight as the
presumption of innocence." Id. at 763.
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated the continuing importance of the policy
considerations informing the presumption of legitimacy in State in re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990) ("Schoolcraft"). Schoolcraft involved a child, J.W.F., born to Linda Schoolcraft
after she had been separated from her husband, Winfield Schoolcraft, for seven months to
one year. Id. at 712. Mr. Schoolcraft became aware of the child's existence when he
received notice of termination proceedings that had been initiated in the juvenile court. He
promptly filed a petition for custody of the child.
Reversing this court's holding that the guardian ad litem for the child had standing to
challenge Schoolcraft's paternity of him, the supreme court stated that the analysis was
"insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy considerations Schoolcraft raises." Id. at 713.
The court articulated the policies of "paramount consideration" to be: (1) "preserving the
stability of the marriage," and (2) "protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary
attacks upon their paternity." Id. The court concluded: "[W]hether individuals can
challenge the presumption of legitimacy should depend not on their legal status alone, but
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on a case-by-case determination of whether the above-stated policies would be undermined
by permitting the challenge." Id.
Applying the articulated standard to the facts before it, the court found that the
marriage between Schoolcraft and J.W.F's mother, who separated long before J.W.F's
birth, and probably even before his conception, was "one in name only." As to the interest
in protecting J.W.F., the court found that J.W.F.'s "expectations as to who his father is
cannot be shaken by permitting a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. The child has
never had a relationship with Schoolcraft, [his biological father], or even his mother, so he
has no expectations as to who his father is." id.
In the context of this case, the policy of protecting marriage takes on broader
implications than were present in Schoolcraft. The Pearsons, unlike Mr. Schoolcraft and his
wife, who lived together for eight months and separated before any children were born or
likely even conceived of their union, lived together for ten years and jointly participated in
the rearing of two children together in an intact family unit. Though they have now divorced,
petitioner and respondent continue to participate in the rearing of two children together in
separate households. The Pearsons was not a marriage "in name only."
As noted by the Florida Court of Appeals in S.D. v. A.G. and J.G., 764 So. 2d 807,
810 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000, "Although divorce may separate and strain a family with children,
divorce does not end the important child-rearing functions of the family." Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy protects not only the tranquility of an existing marriage and the
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legitimacy of children born into a marriage, but also the sanctity of the parent-child
relationship that develops in the context of marriage. From the standpoint of the child bom
into a marriage, the protection that is afforded by the presumption of legitimacy does not
depend on the continued existence of the marriage, but to the contrary, acquires particular
relevance when the marriage dissolves. Our sister state so recognized in In re Marriage of
Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), where the court emphasized: "The state's
interest in applying the [conclusive] presumption [that the husband is the father of children
born into his marriage] is not limited to assuring adequate support for a child or protecting
existing marriages from interference. Rather, as we have noted, the state has a wellrecognized interest in preserving and protecting the dignity of parental relationships,
especially when a marriage is being dissolved and instability is being introduced into a
child's life." Id. at 448; see also Susan H. v. Jack S., 30 Cal. App. 4* 1435,1442-1443
(1994)("The state has an 'interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child
and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and
stability.' This interest is served notwithstanding termination of the mother's marital
relationship with the presumed father.").
The importance of the marital family as the basic unit of society is grounded in large
part on the role that marriage plays in nurturing young children. "A child's psychological tie
to a parent is not a simple, uncomplicated relationship. A child requires from his parents not
only bodily comfort and gratification, but also demands affection, companionship, and
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stimulating intimacy. Where these needs are answered reliably and regularly by the parent,
the child-parent relationship becomes firm, with immensely productive effects on the child's
intellectual and social development. Where there are changes of the parent figure or other
hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship become
evident." See In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331,338 (Kan. 1989) (citing Goldstein,
Freud. & Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, 17-20)
Thus, while genetic testing has become scientifically reliable to the extent that even
the highest standard of proof required to rebut the presumption can be met, courts have
nevertheless sustained the mandate of privileging the marital family and protecting children
from disruption of the relationships developed within it. In California, the courts sustained
the presumption from the attack that it no longer bore a reasonable relationship to the facts
sought to be presumed by designating it a substantive rule of law. See In re Marriage of
Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 ('"A conclusive presumption is in actuality a substantive
rule of law and cannot be said to be unconstitutional unless it transcends such a power of
the Legislature.'") (quoting Kusior v. Silver, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960)). This Court has also
recognized that the presumption of legitimacy is grounded not in considerations of fact, but
in public policy. See Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 407 P.2d 685,692 n.5 (Utah
1965) ("[T]he so-called absolute presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is
based on considerations of public policy rather than absolute certainty as to fact.").
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Thus, while the Schoolcraft opinion considered a marriage "in name only," the facts
of this case require the court to consider a marriage in which the partners to the marriage
jointly reared children together and continue to do so, though the marriage is dissolved.
The stability of the parent-child relationships that are formed within such marriages are of
ongoing significance to the well-being of society and as such are entitled to the ongoing
protection of the state, though the union between the husband and the wife dissolves.
Moreover, for the state to endorse a policy whereby protection of the parent-child
relationship ends upon one partner to the marriage deciding to end the marriage - which
can be done in this state without proof of fault - leaves any husband who lives with a wife
who has had an affair - whether he knows of the affair or not - vulnerable to having the
children he rears taken from him without recourse when the marriage ends. Such a policy
would undermine marriage in general by discouraging reconciliation and/or the formation of
parental bonds with children of the marriage.
In this case, the trial court's ruling, if upheld, would indict rather than support
petitioner - and husbands in similar situations - for attempting to save his marriage.
Petitioner agreed to attempt reconciliation with his wife, and as part of that reconciliation
promised to raise the child she had conceived of an affair with another man as his own.
After having done so, and investing emotionally, financially, and in every other way in the
child, respondent changed her mind, decided she would rather be with intervenor, and
asserted that petitioner had no parental rights in the child. The trial court endorsed
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respondent's assertion, allowed intervenor standing to disestablish petitioner as the child's
father, and ultimately deprived petitioner of any legal custody rights in the child, allowing him
only physical access rights as a non-parent "third party".
If this court upholds the trial court's ruling, any husband who find himself in
petitioner's position would be foolish to make the choice that petitioner did, knowing that the
relationship he establishes with the child of the marriage will be at the whim of the wife.
And, the marital child is left in the uniquely vulnerable position of being in a state of limbo without the protection of permanency afforded the non-marital child by adoption statutes,
and without the protection of permanency traditionally afforded the marital child by the
presumption of legitimacy.
The other policy consideration informing the presumption of legitimacy that the
supreme court identified in Schoolcraft, that of protecting children from disruptive and
unnecessary attacks upon their paternity, is inter-related with the policy of protecting
marriage, and as with that policy, takes on broader implications in the context of this case.
Whereas in Schoolcraft, the child at issue had never had a relationship with Mr. Schoolcraft,
the child whose paternity is at issue in this case, Zachary, lived together with petitioner,
respondent and his older brother, Nicholas, for the first nine months of his life, and
thereafter, lived together with petitioner and Nicholas. By the time intervenor moved to
intervene, Zachary was 17 months of age. He had formed a strong and secure parent-child
bond with petitioner and had a fully developed understanding of who his parents were.
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This state has clearly articulated the paramount importance of ensuring the early and
uninterrupted bonding of infants with their parents, see Wells v. Children's Aid Society. 681
P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), and has developed a "swift permanence" policy in both the adoption
and child welfare context. See In re J.M. & N.P.. 940 P.2d 527,539 n.8 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). In the context of children born outside of marriage, the supreme court states:
It is and should be the policy of the law to so operate as to encourage the
finding of suitable homes and parents for children in that need. It is obvious
that persons who might be willing to accept a child for adoption will be more
reluctant to do so if a consenting parent is permitted to arbitrarily change her
mind and revoke the consent, and thus desolate the plan of the adoptive
parents and bring to naught all of their time, effort, expense and emotional
involvement.
See id.(quoting In re Adoption of F.. 488 P.2d 130,134 (Utah 1971). Moreover, our
legislature has found:
(a) The state has a compelling interest in providing stable and permanent
homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in preventing the disruption
of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the
needs of children;
(c) Adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive
placements;
(d) Adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected liberty and privacy
interest in retaining custody of an adopted child; and
(e) An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a timely and full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and
upon the child's birth
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2) (2004).
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In the marital context, it is no less essential to provide children and marital fathers
with permanence and stability in their parent-child relationships. To adopt a policy that
would allow the legal relationship between marital fathers and the children of their marriage
to be disestablished at any time by a blood test is to afford marital fathers less protection
than prospective adoptive parents, and to afford children born into marriage less
permanence and stability than children born outside of marriage. Marital children are
entitled to the same protection and the same permanence in the relationships they develop
with their parents as are non-marital children.
In this case, the trial court did not adequately consider the relevant policy
considerations attending the question of whether the presumption of legitimacy should have
been allowed to be rebutted. The court refused to take evidence on the issue - while noting
that "[tjhere is no competent evidence before the court to suggest that allowing Mr. Thanos
to intervene would be disruptive" - and instead summarily adopted Dr. Jill Sanders' report,
informed by her unsupported view of the general importance - not to Zachary in particular of the biological relationship between parents and children and her speculation regarding
the future importance to Zachary of his relationship with intervenor.
While Dr. Sanders may have expertise in custody evaluations, she has no expertise
in biological versus non-biological relationships between parents and children. Dr. Douglas
Goldsmith does have this expertise, both from his work as executive director of The
Children's Center, and his teaching and publishing on attachment theory. See R. 2531, at
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113:23 -118:15. Had the court permitted an evidentiary hearing before deciding the crucial
issue of standing in this case, the court would have had the benefit of Dr. Goldsmith's
expertise. As it was, the court had already disestablished petitioner as Zachary's legal
father by the time of trial, when Dr. Goldsmith testified that there is no distinction in the
process of attachment between a biological parent and child on the one hand and a nonbiological parent and child on the other, id. at 120:17-121:13, that it is not essential, as Dr.
Sanders' opined in her report, for children to have a relationship with their biological parent,
id. at 160:3-12, that from the child's point of view, the presence or absence of a biological
tie makes no difference as between caregivers, id. at 160:13 -162:13, and that to a child of
Zachary's age, the biological tie to a father has no meaning, id. at 163:17 -164:20.
Further, as a custody evaluator, Dr. Sanders has no expertise in public policy and is
unqualified to address the paramount concerns that the presumption of legitimacy protects.
This failure is evident in the court's findings, which fail to address the paramount
consideration whether disestablishing petitioner as Zachary's legal father (as opposed to
allowing intervenor to intervene, which is the question that Dr. Sanders answered) would be
disruptive to Zachary, or whether intervener's untimely interest in developing a relationship
with his putative son should take precedence over the protection of the established parentchild relationship between petitioner and his marital son.
The court erred in failing to conduct a proper standing analysis. A proper analysis
would have required the court to address the policy concerns set forth above and to take
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evidence on and make findings addressing those concerns, including, at a minimum, the
risk to Zachary of losing legal protection in the relationship with the man he knows as his
father, and the importance to him of having early, permanent and uninterrupted identification
of those individuals who will function as his parents.
B.

Constitutional Analysis

Petitioner was Zachary's legal father until he was disestablished as such by the trial
court. He was not merely a "presumptive" father. "Under any other interpretation, a
husband could never be more than a presumptive father absent an adjudication of
paternity." G.F.C. v. S.G. and D.G., 686 So. 2d 1382,1385 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997).
As Zachary's legal father, petitioner enjoyed all the rights, duties and obligations of a
parent, and those rights are protected by the Constitution of this state. Article I, § 7 of the
Utah Constitution guarantees that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. Article I, § 25 ensures that the
constitution's enumeration of rights "shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained
by the people." A husband's legal relationship with a child that is born into his intact
marriage and with whom he establishes an enduring parent-child relationship equal in all
respects to the relationship he enjoys with other children of his marriage, is undoubtedly a
liberty interest, as well as an inherent and retained right protected by the Utah Constitution.
In In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), this Court addressed the constitutionality of
a statute that authorized the juvenile court to involuntarily terminate a mother's parental
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rights upon finding that it would be in the best interests of her child to do so. Id- at 1374. In
holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court began by referencing its previous decisions,
in which the following had been declared: "[T]he ideals of individual liberty which protect the
sanctity of one's home and family" are "essential in a free society

" Id. at 1372 (quoting

In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855,856 (1981). A parent has a "fundamental right, protected by
the Constitution, to sustain his relationship with his child." Id- (quoting State in re Walter B.,
577 P.2d 119,124 (Utah 1978)).
Acknowledging that the Court had not attempted to define with exactness the liberty
interest guaranteed by the Constitution, nevertheless, it was felt to include, without doubt,
"the right of an individual to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id.
Addressing those rights retained by the people, the Court stated that "[t]he rights
inherent in family relationships - husband-wife, parent-child, and sibling - are the most
obvious examples of rights retained by the people. They are 'natural,' 'intrinsic,' or 'prior' in
the sense that our Constitutions presuppose them, as they presuppose the right to own and
dispose of property." Further, "[t]he integrity of the family and the parents' inherent right and
authority to rear their own children have been recognized as fundamental axioms of AngloAmerican culture

To protect the [individual] in his constitutionally guaranteed right to

form and preserve the family is one of the basic principles for which organized government
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is established.' 'The family is the basis of our society.' 'The family entity is the core
element upon which modern civilization is founded.' This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.'" id. at 1373 (citations omitted).
The Court went on to address the rights of parents in different circumstances as
expressed in United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the federal constitution,
stating: "Parental rights are at their apex for parents who are married. Some variation
exists among unwed fathers." Id. at 1374. Applying these principles to the case before it,
the Court emphasized: "The parental liberty right at issue in this case is fundamental to the
existence of the institution of family, which is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.'" Id. at 1375 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). It
was this "rooting in history and the common law" that the Court emphasized "validates and
limits the due process protection afforded parental rights." ]d. The Court concluded: "For
the reasons and upon the precedents discussed above, we conclude that the Utah
Constitution recognizes and protects the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain
parental ties to his or her child under Article I, § 7 and § 25, and that the United States
Constitution recognizes and protects the same right under the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments." jd. at 1377.
The parent-child relationship that is protected by the precedents and reasoning set
forth in In re J.P. is no less protected because it is grounded in the institution of marriage
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rather than in biological conception. Nowhere does the Court isolate parenthood from
family in discussing its inherent and fundamental nature. Now, more than ever, marriage
and marital relationships are in need of the law's protection.
Petitioner's relationship with Zachary is a natural relationship in that it does not exist
by operation of a decree, but rather by virtue of petitioner's assumption of the legal and
moral obligation to father the children that are born to his marriage, and "'the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association.'" Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972)). It is by
no means clear that petitioner is not the "natural" father of Zachary by his acceptance and
fulfillment of his natural, moral, legal, and socially sanctioned role as husband and father.
See Black's Law Dictionary, at 534 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983).
Nevertheless, the relationship can be analogized to an adoptive relationship in the
sense that it is not a "blood" relationship. In Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760 (Utah
1985), this Utah Supreme Court refused to accord any distinction between the parental
relationship that exists between the legitimated child to his biological father and the adopted
child to his adoptive mother. The court stated: "The status of an adopted child is in all
respects identical with that of a natural child. The relationship of the adoptive parent and
the child is the same legally as that of natural parent and child, with all the rights and duties
of that relationship. That status remains inviolate irrespective of a subsequent divorce." Id.
at 763. The Court further noted that "'many parents who have had both natural and
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adopted children attest that it was impossible to make a distinction between the affection
they have for the natural and the adopted children."' id. n.2 (quoting In re Adoption of P.,
252 P.2d 223 (Utah 1953).
In In re S.A.. 2001 UT App 307,37 P.3d 1166, this court held that a father had a
protected liberty interest both in maintaining the parent-child relationship he enjoyed with his
child and in maintaining the familial relationship he had with his wife. Id. U14.
The legal relationship that existed between petitioner and Zachary, created by
marriage, is worthy of no less deference than the legal relationship of husband and wife, or
the legal relationship of adoptive parent and adopted child.
Our case law has also accorded the psychological relationship of parent-child great
deference and recognized it to be a liberty interest protected by the due process clause of
our Constitution. See Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64,67 (Utah 1978) (holding that one who
stands in loco parentis to a child has a constitutionally protected right implicit in the due
process clause of our state's constitution which "may confer the same rights upon a
stepparent as those enjoyed by a natural parent."); see also Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App
367, n.11,38 P.3d 307 (citing Gribble for proposition that "[wjhere one stands in loco
parentis to another, the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words
imply, exactly the same as between parent and child").
Our sister states have recognized that a legal father has a fundamental liberty
interest in maintaining his filial relationship with his child. See Achumba v. Neustein. 793
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So. 2d 1013,1021 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) ("[Husband's] due process rights, as [child's] legal
father were not considered in the pending wrongful death action. The relationship between
a parent and child is constitutionally protected. As such, that relationship cannot be altered
or impugned without considering the 'legal father's' due process rights to maintain his
relationship with the child."); Ferguson v. Winston, 996 P.2d 841,846 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000)
("[T]he cases have been unanimous in concluding that a parent has a fundamental liberty
interest in maintaining a familial relationship with a child.").
Petitioner's legal and psychological relationship with Zachary is entitled to
constitutional protection. As such, it cannot be terminated by an order declaring intervenor
Zachary's "natural" father without a clear and compelling reason to do so that carefully
weighs the competing interests at stake. See Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v.
Privette, 617 So. 2d 305,309 n.7 (Fla. 1993) ("We essentially are dealing with a species of
termination proceeding when the petition will have the effect of vesting parental rights in the
putative natural father and removing parental rights from the legal father. We do not see
how a court constitutionally could apply a standard less than that recognized in Santoskv v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), and other applicable cases where this is true.").
The trial court abdicated its duty to weigh, or even identify, the interests at stake in
this controversy and thereby failed in its duty to protect the rights of both Zachary and
petitioner, which are of constitutional significance. And, contrary to the usual case involving
a question of constitutionally protected rights, in this case the interests of petitioner,
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Zachary, and the state are aligned. Petitioner's constitutionally protected liberty interest is
in maintaining intact his parental rights in his son. Zachary's interest is in maintaining
undisrupted the legal parent-child relationship that nurtures and sustains him. Cf. In re
Bridget R.. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (children hold fundamental rights and
interests in family relationships which are of a constitutional dimension and which do not
depend on the existence of a biological relationship). The state's interest is in protecting the
legitimacy of children, protecting the sanctity of relationships that develop within the marital
family, see In re Marriage of Freeman, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1437,1450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996),
and in facilitating early and uninterrupted bonding of newborns to their parents, see Wells v.
Children's Aid Society. 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).
These interests outweigh intervener's countervailing, untimely, interest in asserting
parental rights in Zachary.
In determining whether an asserted interest is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by due process, the interest sought to be protected must first be carefully defined.
See Dawn P. v. Superior Court of Riverside County. 17 Cal. 4th 932,940 (Cal. 1998). In
this case, the trial court concluded, without analysis, that "[b]oth the U.S. and Utah
Constitutions grant Peter Thanos constitutional rights afforded to a natural parent." R.975,
1f 23. This description of intervener's interest is inaccurate. Intervenor does not claim an
interest simply as an alleged "natural parent." He claims an interest as the alleged
biological father of a child born into the marriage of another man who is deemed the child's
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father by operation of law upon birth. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2. The constitutional
significance of his claim is therefore distinct from that of other unwed fathers. The
constitution requires some protection of the biological father's opportunity, which no other
male possesses, to develop a relationship with his offspring. "Where, however, the child is
born into an extant marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with the
similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage." Michael H. v. Gerald P., 491
U.S. 110,129 (1989). Thus, to expand the "liberty" afforded intervenor is to contract the
equivalent liberty of petitioner, or as Justice Scalia framed it: "[T]o provide protection to an
adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father." jd. at 130.
Carefully described, therefore, the interest intervenor claims is constitutionally
protected is his interest in disestablishing petitioner as the legal father of a child born to
petitioner's intact marriage, where the child has a fully developed and unquestioned fatherchild relationship with petitioner, to have himself declared the father of the child.
Once the asserted interest is identified, the court must next determine whether the
interest denominated as a "liberty" is a fundamental right traditionally protected by our
society and rooted in history, tradition and the conscience of our people. See Michael H. v.
Gerald P., 491 U.S. 110,123 (1989)("[T]he Pue Process Clause affords only those
protections 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental"') (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,105 (1934)). Only if the
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liberty interest is fundamental is it necessary to conduct a complex balancing of competing
interests. See Dawn P., 17 Cal. 4th at 940-41.
It is intervener's burden to establish that the interest he has in disestablishing
petitioner as Zachary's legal father to have his paternity declared is so deeply embedded
within our traditions as to be a fundamental right. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126. At no
time has he made any reasoned effort to do so. Nor did the district court articulate the basis
for its conclusion that intervener's interest rises to the level of a fundamental right. It cannot
be denied that the plurality of United States Supreme Court did not hold the similar claim of
a biological father to be of constitutional significance, but instead considered the question of
whether a state may give categorical preference to the marital father over the biological
father to be a matter of public policy for the state to decide. See id. at 129-30.1

1

Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. was joined by Justice Rehnquist, and in all but
footnote 6, by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment,
and wrote separately to distinguish the issues at hand as he saw them: first, is it
unconstitutional to prevent Michael from obtaining a judicial determination that he is her
biological father; and second, is it unconstitutional to deny Michael a fair opportunity to
prove that the child's best interests would be served by granting him visitation? See
Michael H. v. Gerald P.. 491 U.S. 110.132 (1989). As to the first question, Justice
Stevens wrote: "I agree with Justice Scalia that the Federal Constitution imposes no
obligation upon a State to 'declare facts unless some legal consequence hinges upon the
requested declaration.' The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds.'" Id.
at 133 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983)). As to the second question,
Justice Stevens assumed for the purposes of his opinion that a constitutionally protected
family relationship might exist between Michael H. and his daughter. As distinct from this
case, Michael H.'s daughter identified Michael as her father, calling him "Paddy" jd. at 144,
and the child's guardian ad litem asserted that she had more than one psychological or de
facto father and should be entitled to maintain her filial relationship with both. jd. at 114. If
so, Justice Stevens concluded, the relationship was sufficiently protected by California law
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Michael H. differs from this case in that, in Michael H., the mother remained married
to the husband and the alleged biological father was denied access to the child. In this
case, the mother is now married to intervenor, and intervener's access to the child is
therefore secure. It is intervener's contention that this distinction renders the reasoning of
Michael H. inapplicable and elevates his interest to a fundamental right.2

that gave Michael H. the opportunity to prove his entitlement to visitation as "any other
person having an interest in the welfare of the child." ]d. at 133. Utah law also affords the
psychological parent of a child the right to seek visitation with the child. See Gribble v.
Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). Here, intervenor does not claim to be Zachary's
psychological parent (and it is undisputed that he is not and that petitioner is) and does not
seek rights in Zachary on any ground other than as would ensue from a judicial declaration
that he is Zachary's biological father. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
federal constitution does not entitle him to such relief.
2
Whereas the integrity of the marriage is not at issue in this case due to the dissolution of
the Pearson's marriage, the integrity and sanctity of the parent-child relationship developed
in the context of the marital family is and calls into play the same considerations that
defeated Michael H's claim. Moreover, the real effect of denying intervenor the right to be
declared Zachary's legal father is of much less significance here, where intervener's ability
to develop a relationship with Zachary is not impaired by the denial: intervenor is assured a
relationship with Zachary, essentially of his own making, by virtue of his marriage to
Zachary's mother. By contrast, the alleged biological father in Michael H. was completely
cut off from the child with whom he sought visitation by the dismissal of his paternity suit.
Courts in our sister states have had no difficulty barring a biological father's claims where,
as here, it is clear that the real purpose of the suit is to cut off the ex-husband's rights in the
child, not to secure rights of visitation that have been denied. See Ghrist v. Fricks, 465
S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) ("Public policy will not permit a mother and an alleged father
to enlist the aid of the courts to disturb the emotional ties existing between a child and his
legal father after sitting on their rights for the first three years of the child's life."); In re.
D.B.S., 888 P.2d 875,887 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding dismissal of paternity action
brought by alleged biological father of child who married mother after mother's divorce from
husband, stating: "[T]he child's present relationships are healthy and stable, the child is
unconcerned with his parentage, [ ] a blood test would threaten relationships which have
supported the child from birth and promise to support him in the future[, and t]he movant's
motives are suspect.").
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The reasoning of Michael H. pertains and does not turn on the mother's current
marital status. The question remains whether the relationship between a married woman, a
man married to another woman with whom she commits adultery, and a child alleged to be
born of that union into the extant marriage of the woman and her husband, has been treated
as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, jd. at 124. It is
impossible to find that it has. Historically, adultery has been treated as a crime, and it
remains a crime in this state. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103. At common law, alienation
of affection and criminal conversation were widely recognized torts, the latter being directed
specifically to adultery. The tort of alienation of affection, by which liability may attach to a
third person who intentionally interferes with a marital relationship, retains continued validity
in this state. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).
Traditionally, society was so scornful of bringing children into the world as a result of
adulterous conduct that "bastardy" was also a crime. Utah's Bastardy Act was enacted in
1911 as part of the penal code and provided for the arrest and arraignment of the putative
father. Whereas the father of a child born out of wedlock historically had no parental rights
in his child, the husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times,
been protected by the presumption of legitimacy.
Consistent with the presumption of legitimacy and vindicating similar policies, Lord
Mansfield's Rule dates back to the common law of the eighteenth century, gained wide
acceptance in the jurisdiction of this country, and has continued application today in this
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state. See In re J.W.F.. 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). The rule forbids a husband or wife to
give testimony that would that would tend to illegitimate their child, or for a court to consider
such evidence. See id. at 714 (holding court of appeals erred in relying on evidence that
contravened Lord Mansfield's rule). In 1777, Lord Mansfield said: "It is a rule founded in
decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say
after marriage that the offspring is spurious; or especially the mother, who is the offending
party." See Lopes v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687,691 n.3 (Utah 1974).
It is clear that our history and traditions demonstrate a resounding repugnance for
the conduct of fathering a child in the marriage of another man. It cannot be claimed to be a
"right" traditionally protected by our society and rooted in the history, tradition and the
conscience of our people. To the contrary, the conduct has been criminalized, the resulting
biological link accorded no protection, and the child and husband of the marriage protected
from such claims by longstanding, universally applicable laws with enduring application to
the present day.
Moreover, even if it were appropriate in this case to look at the liberty interest that
the trial court identified as "rights afforded to a natural parent" in isolation from both
petitioner's and Zachary's liberty interests that are necessarily implicated by those rights,
which it is not, intervener's claim of constitutional protection must fail. The extent to which
an unwed biological father's interest in parental rights in his child will acquire constitutional
protection depends on the extent to which the unwed father "demonstrates a full
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i iniirmtini'iii tn i|n< it'spunsibilitips ol parenthood by '[coming] forward to participate in the
rearing of his child.'" Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). The interest the unwed
father has is an opportunity interest, which is lost when he fails to seize the moment and
permits another to assume the responsibility of meeting the child's needs. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-30-4.12(e) ("An unmarried biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires
constitutional protection

when limit urn mstrates a limHy and lull unninitiiipnt In the

responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth.").
In In re D.B.S.. 888 P.2d 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995), the court addressed the
constitutional claims of a man in intervener's position who had not promptly asserted
parental rights in his child, but instead allowed the child's legal father to do so. After the
mother and legal father divorced, the biological father then man

I

argued that the relationship he subsequently developed with the child should be accorded
constitutional protection.
The Kansas Court of Appeals rejected this argument. The court noted that the
biological father had not been prevented from developing a relationship with the child by the
mother, but rather had agreed to "stay i nit df tin piduie' l<l,ilM4
agreeing

Tli^ umrt held "|lln

other's request] to stay mil nf the picture, [the biological father]

surrendered whatever constitutional opportunity he may have had to develop a protected
relationship with D.B.S. There is no authority to support the proposition that having
surrendered those rights he could later reclaim them by developing a stepfather relationship
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after four years of providing no parental contact or support. We are justified, as the United
States Supreme Court did in Lehr, to hold that [the biological father's] interest in [the child]
came too late to preserve any constitutional liberty interest. [The legal father] voluntarily
assumed the duties of paternity long before [the biological father] acted to secure any rights.
Therefore, without following the plurality opinion in Michael H., but relying on the total
opinion of the United States Supreme Court therein, we hold the rights of [the biological
father] herein do not amount to a liberty interest sufficient to require that he be granted the
requested blood tests." idEven in Texas, where the Texas Supreme Court held its statutory scheme denying
standing to an alleged biological father to assert paternity in a child born into the marriage of
another unconstitutional under the Texas constitution, the court emphasized that the
biological father must assert his interest near the time of the child's birth to preserve it. The
court held: "In a situation such as that presented here where the biological father does
assert his interest near the time of the child's birth, standing is constitutionally mandated if
he both 1) acknowledges responsibility for child support or other care and maintenance, and
2) makes serious and continuous efforts to establish a relationship with the child." In re
J.W.T.. 872 S.W.2d 189,195 (Tex. 1994).
In this state, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an unwed biological father's
opportunity interest in parenting his child is inchoate only and requires a demonstrated and
timely commitment to the responsibilities of parenting to warrant constitutional protection.
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Cf. Swavne v. Lu.S. Social Services, 7M,;i P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) (discussing cases
involving unwed father's opportunity interest). Intervener's interest, which involves a
legitimate child born into the marriage of another man, does not gain greater protection by
that circumstance than the unwed biological father who has refrained from violating another
man's marriage, so that he alone among unwed biological fathers is afforded the lu
choosing when he may decide it is convenient to come forvi •

assert his interests.

Rather, the circumstance of the child being born into the marriage of another man is
analogous to adoption from birth: the alleged biological father takes the risk that any
interest he may have in the child will be cut off by the legal father's acceptance of the child
into his family. See Dawn P. v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 17 Cal. l lh 932 (Cal.
1998) ("A man who wishes to father a child and ensuie hi*- lelationship with \\\?.\ child can
oartner, entering into a marriage, and undertaking the responsibilities
marriage imposes. One who instead fathers a child with a woman married to another man
takes the risk that the child will be raised within that marriage and that he will be excluded
from participation in the child's life.").
I" us case, intervenor, with full knowledge of respondent's pregnancy, and believing
Hie <hili I lu be his from January 1999, took no steps whatsoever to come forward and
shoulder the burdens of fatherhood during the pregnancy, nor to establish a relationship
with Zachary or assert an interest in him after his birth. He did nothing, choosing to sit on
whatever rights he may have had for two years, until January 2001, when he filed a motion
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to intervene in the Pearson's divorce action. He so conducted himself to maintain intact the
deception of his wife. It was intervener's choice, and no one else's, to elevate his separate
interests above his interest in Zachary.
Though intervenor has now developed a healthy step-parent relationship with
Zachary (and Nicholas), he cannot reclaim the lost opportunity that he may have had to
come forward and act as Zachary's father. Zachary now has an established father, who is
not simply a fungible item capable of replacement at the convenience of another. See In re
Marriage of Freeman, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439,446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("The relationship of
father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an old cloak, used and unwanted.").
The trial court erred in concluding, without analysis, that intervenor had
constitutionally protected rights as Zachary's biological father, and in failing to recognize
petitioner's constitutionally protected right to retain his legal relationship with Zachary intact.
Because of the trial court's erroneous views, it conducted the Schoolcraft analysis in an
analytically flawed way, being overly solicitous of intervener's biological connection with
Zachary. Cf. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635,644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (vacating
court's order based on analytically flawed findings where trial court believed Utah Code
Ann. § 30-5-2 was unconstitutional).
This court should reverse the trial court and reinstate the recommendations of the
commissioner based on the record that has now been established, holding that intervenor
does not have standing to establish paternity of Zachary.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON GROUNDS OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
granted intervenor standing to assert his paternity of Zachary,

petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that intervenor and
respondent were equitably estopped from denying petitioner's paternity of Zachary
(R.1361). In compliance with Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules nl Civil Piuadure,
petitioner's memorandum in suppoil of the motion set forth his statement of undisputed
facts supported l>y citation to relevant materials (R.1304).
Neither intervenor nor respondent controverted petitioner's fact statement, nor did
either party's response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for
(R.1377,1427). Therefore, "each fact set forth by petitioner in his memorandum was
deemed admitted loi tin1 purpose of summary judgment," Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A), and
petitic

was entitled to summary judgment if the facts he set forth supported judgment in

his favor as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v.
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984); Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982).
The trial court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgi

i ludinq that "the

doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case." (R.1741, fl 4.) This
i

rroneous. The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a statement,

admission, act or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not take on the basis of the first
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party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that
would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act. See Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 1999 UT
100,1f 34; State v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676, 680 (Utah 1997).
The uncontroverted facts show that respondent and intervenor acted consistently
with petitioner's paternity of Zachary for two years, from the time they learned of Zachary's
conception until they commenced this litigation. Respondent's statements and actions,
wherein she actively sought and encouraged petitioner's assumption of the role of Zachary's
father, are inconsistent with her subsequent position that petitioner is not Zachary's father.
Likewise, intervener's failure to act as a father to Zachary for two years while petitioner
openly assumed that role, and his active concealment of Zachary's paternity for his own
purposes, are inconsistent with his later asserted claim of paternity. The uncontroverted
facts establish that the first element of equitable estoppel is met.
The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the second and third elements of
equitable estoppel are also met. Respondent's representations to petitioner that she viewed
petitioner as Zachary's father and wished petitioner to treat him in all respects as his son,
making no distinction between him and Nicholas, and intervener's acquiescence in that
course of conduct, were an integral part of petitioner's bonding with Zachary as his father.
Relying on respondent's repeated representations and assurances, petitioner took on the
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commitment of fatherhood, caring ti

• • respondent throughout her pregnancy,

andshouidenmi pi unary caretaking responsibilities for Zachary upon his birth.
Petitioner acted both reasonably and morally in taking on the responsibilities of
father to Zachary, a child born into his marriage and younger brother to his first son, at his
wife's request and in support of their continued marriage. Had he not done so, respoi .; t
would have been without support during her pregnam y ,nnl u\ least tho first 111
Zachary's life, and Zachary would have been without a father during his infancy and young
childhood. Moreover, after respondent left the marital home, Zachary and Nicholas would
have been separated from one another half-time to accommodate petitioner's custody of
Nicholas while Zachary remained with respondent.
It is both reasonable and socially desirable for petitioner V > have acted as h* did
rather than to have repudiated the rnamaoY' which had functioned well for the care and
upbringing of Nicholas and was not without hope of overcoming the differences between the
spouses. It is both reasonable and socially desirable for petitioner to have acted as he did
rather than to have repudiated the child, leaving him fatherless and disrupting the sibling
relationship with his older brother.
Additionally, it was entirely within respondent and intervenor's control to prevent
petition; >i from Urn. \>>u the role of Zachary's father had they desired that he not do so.
Intervenor could have asserted his paternity of Zachary and stepped forward to take on the
responsibilities attendant thereto from the date he first learned of respondent's pregnancy.
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Respondent could have left the marital home and reared Zachary on her own or with
intervenor had she not desired petitioner's participation. Had they done so, petitioner could
not and would not have developed the relationship that he did with Zachary. It was
respondent's and intervener's actions that resulted in petitioner and Zachary developing the
parent-child bond that they now enjoy, while intervenor's relationship is that of step-parent.
For respondent and intervenor to be permitted to now repudiate the course that they
chose for two years is inequitable and unjust and injures petitioner. He is denied the fruits
of the labor he has undertaken for Zachary's benefit, with the reasonable expectation that
he would continue in his status as Zachary's father. Moreover, he suffers the inestimable
loss of the father-child relationship that he has developed with Zachary, being relegated
instead to the role of "non-parent" with no legal custody rights and visitation as a "third
party". All the elements of equitable estoppel are met in this case, and the doctrine should
have been applied to bar respondent and intervenor from pursuing their untimely challenge
to Zachary's paternity.
The doctrine has been applied in our sister states to bar assertions of paternity under
similar circumstances. See Kristen P. v. Stephen P., N.Y.S.2d 771,773 (App. Piv. 2001)
(applying equitable estoppel to bar mother and biological father from challenging husband's
paternity of 4-year-old child with whom husband had developed a parent-child relationship,
concluding that "[i]t would be unjust and inequitable to permit [the biological father] to take a
parental role at this late juncture."); Richard W. v. Roberta Y.. 658 N.Y.S.2d 506,506-07
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(App. Div. 1997); In re Marriage of Sleeper, 92!

;:

' ! - } - ^29-30 (Oi

App. 1996)

(estopping wil' • lr< »m contesting husband's paternity of children born into their marriage,
fvpn thnimh husband had had a vasectomy and both wife and husband knew husband was
not the biological father of the children, yet they held him out to be, and husband had relied
on wife's assertions that he was the children's father, though they were not his biological
children, to develop a deep parental both with the children); Randy A J . v. Norma I.J., 677
d biological father of child born during mother's
> husband were estopped from asserting genetic test results to rebut the marital
child presumption where mother and biological father stood silent for 15 months while
husband and child developed deep emotional ties, husband paid child's expenses, and
husband had organized his life around providing for the child's needs); see also Dipaolo v.
Cuqini, 811 A.2d 1053,1056-57 (Super. Ct. Pa. 2002)(affirming dismissal of mother's
(

^hild support against biological father where husband and wife held out

children as their own for 6 years, observing: '"[T]he doctrine of estoppel in paternity actions
is aimed at 'achieving fairness between the parents by holding them, both mother and
father, to their prior conduct regarding the paternity of the child.'")(citation omitted); In re
Shocklev, 123 S.W.3d 642(Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (applying equitable estoppel against mother
>/ears after birth of child encouraged non-biological father to assume rights and
duties of father, observing that "[e]stoppel is based on the public policy that children should
be secure in knowing who their parents are.").
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Additionally, the Uniform Parentage Act (2002), approved and recommended for
enactment in all the states by the national conference of commissioners on uniform state
laws, incorporates the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar challenges to a child's paternity
under appropriate circumstances where the child has a presumptive father. See Unif.
Parentage Act § 608 (2002), 37 Fam. Law Q. 5 (Spring 2002). The Uniform Parentage Act
has been introduced for adoption in this state this legislative session. See S.B. 14.
There can be little doubt that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is validly applied in
paternity actions, and that it has application in this case. The court erred in concluding that
"[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of this case." R.1741, fl 4.
This court should reverse the trial court's denial of petitioner's motion for summary
judgment, holding that, as a matter of law, respondent and intervenor are equitably
estopped from challenging Zachary's paternity.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION
AGAINST PETITIONER IN HIS CLAIM FOR CUSTODY OF ZACHARY
The Utah Supreme Court restated and formalized the parental presumption in

Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982). The court stated: "This presumption
recognizes 'the natural right and authority of the parent to the child's custody

' It is

rooted in the common experience of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally
share a strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural parent will normally
sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the child's benefit, and that a natural parent is
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understanding and better able to win the confidence and
of the child than anyone else.'" Id. at 40 (citations omitted).
The rationale for the presumption is that it will normally serve the best interests of the
child, which is the governing consideration in custody cases. Kishpaugh v. Kishpauqh, 745
P.2d 1248,1250 (Utah 1987). Where it does not do so, rigid application i il Hie presumpiiun
is not mandated. Cf. InreH.R.V., 9Ub P 2d 91 '\ f M/

I'HHII V\

App 1995) (stating that

Hutchison "does not require an inflexible, formulaic approach"). Thus, the Supreme Court
emphasized in Kishpauqh v. Kishpaugh: "We have not hesitated to find the presumption
inapplicable when we have concluded that it does not serve the best interests of the child in
a particular class of cases." 745 P.2d at 1255, n.1.
This court stated in In re H.R.V. that "children h,.ivi» a right to be loved, protected,
. ii n I uii i 'i 11« it,. ii n I society has an interest in seeing that they are. Allowing a natural parent
to reassert the parental presumption after the parent's own conduct has destroyed that
presumption would do nothing to further the children's rights or society's goals. Neither
would such a practice serve the children's long-recognized need for stability in
relationships." 906 P.2d 917 (Uta.
Likew

'

App. 1995).

who is the biological parent of a child born into her

marriage with her husband, to assert the presumption against her husband in a divorce
proceeding, where her own conduct affirmed, nurtured and encouraged the parent-child
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bond between the husband and child, defeats society's goal of protecting children from
destabilization of their parental relationships at divorce.
Welcoming an infant into one's marriage and nurturing it through crucial periods in
which parent-child bonds form creates exactly the relationship that the parental presumption
seeks to protect, namely, one of mutual attachment, willingness to sacrifice for the child,
and unique ability to win the child's confidence and love. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court
made clear in Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P.2d 760 (Utah), cert denied, 474 U.S. 848 (1985),
a biological parent may not assert the parental presumption against an adoptive parent.
In this case, like in Bonwich, the Hutchison presumption should not apply. While no
Utah case is directly on point with the factual scenario presented by this case, other
jurisdictions have addressed the parental presumption where it has been asserted against a
presumptive father.
In Davis v. LaBrec, 549 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2001), LaBrec legitimated his one-year-old
son pursuant to Georgia statute and then initiated a custody proceeding against the mother.
In response, the mother asserted that LaBrec was not the child's biological father.
Subsequently Davis, the child's biological father, filed a complaint to set aside the previous
legitimation order, to establish paternity and to obtain custody of the child. Id. at 76-77.
The trial court granted Davis's petition, concluding that if the biological father was found to
be fit, the court was required to grant the petition, jd. at 77. On appeal the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the trial court had applied the wrong standard, reasoning: "First,
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LaBrec

qal father.... LaBrec stands in • •

^-

osition as any other

parent and possesses the same custodial rights with respect to the c h i l d — [PJrior to any
State involvement, LaBrec had a developed father and son relationship with the child which
was later consummated through legitimation proceedings

Under these circumstances,

we find that Davis's interests as the biological father are adequately protected by II ie bu-ot
interests of llii'UnidbLiiiildk

"1 (citations omitted).

In Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179 (N.H. 1996), the trial court determined that the
husband's legal paternity was rebutted upon the establishment of the biological father's
paternity and that he thereafter had no custodial rights in the child at issue. Id. at 1181.
The husband appealed. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the paternity
determination, but reversed the (,uo;..<
instances in which an individual

. ermination. The court stated: '

assert legal rights to a child not biologically his own is

if that person stands in loco parentis toward the child

By acting in loco parentis, an

individual admits the child into his family and treats the child as a family member
Although the assumption of in loco parentis status is voluntary, while the relationship exists
an individual is 'charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities.'" Id.
182 (citations omitted). Tin • rourl emphasized: "Which party or parties are ultimately
entitled to custody of the child must be judicially ascertained among all relevant individuals
using the best interests of the child as the primary guide. We therefore remand the case for
a hearing to determine custody consistent with the best interests of the child." Jd. at 1184.
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals applied the same reasoning in Moss v. Moss, CA991312 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000). Here, the trial court awarded custody of two children, ages 6
and 3, to the husband based on the best interests of the children. The older child was the
husband's biological child and the younger child was the child of another man, born during
the marriage. Both children were the biological children of the wife. The wife appealed,
arguing that the trial court erred in awarding custody of the younger child to the husband
without first making a finding that she, the biological parent, was unfit. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in applying the best interests
standard where the evidence established that the husband stood in loco parentis to the
younger child. |d.
Our supreme court adopted the doctrine of in loco parentis in Gribble v. Gribble, 583
P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). There, the court granted a husband standing to seek visitation of his
step-son, stating: "'Where one stands in loco parentis to another, the rights and liabilities
arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and
child.'" Id. at 66 (citation omitted). The court noted that the husband claimed to have lived
with his stepson since he was two months old and to have treated him as his own son. "If
these claims are true," the court stated, "and if they indicate his desire to stand in the place
of a parent, then appellant's relationship may entitle him to the same rights accorded to
natural parents." jd. at 67.
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The doctrine was subsequently reaffirmed in Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367,
where the court noted: "The term 'in loco parentis' means in the place of a parent, and a
'person in loco parentis' is one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent
without formal adoption. Whether or not one assumes this status depends on whether that
person intends to assume that obligation. 'Where one stands in loco parentis to another,
the rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same
as between parent and child.'" id. 1| 36, n.11.
In F.B.V.A.L.G., 795 A.2d 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), the New Jersey
court explained: "The in loco parentis principle is a venerable concept. As a private law
rule, it developed in the common law for a variety of policy reasons expressly to govern
family situations within a marriage in which a child was born and acknowledged by the male
head of the family, and treated by him as other children were or would have been treated,
with a later discovery that another person was the biological father of the child

Even in

contemporary contexts, the private law in loco parentis principle and concepts flowing
therefrom have been applied primarily in situations in which a parent-child relationship has
developed in a family setting. The principle has been useful in determining whether to apply
waiver or estoppel either to a person functioning as a parent who believed initially he was
the father of the child, or to such a person who always knew he was not the biological father
but nevertheless assumed a parental role." Id. at 335-36.
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In this case, it is clear that petitioner is and has functioned as a parent to Zachary
from before his birth. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that respondent was entitled to
the benefit of the parental presumption in her claim for custody of Zachary as against
petitioner, finding: "[l]t is ironic at best to concude that petitioner is a non-parent of Zachary
when in real terms petitioner has established a strong mutual bond and relationship with
Zachary, albeit in loco parentis." (R.2434, at 20, fl 35). The court felt compelled to "followQ
the dictates of the Hutchison case" and ruled accordingly (R.2434, at 20, U 35).
Hutchison does not dictate that respondent is entitled to the parental presumption
against petitioner for two reasons. First, Hutchison did not involve a child born into the
husband's marriage. Rather, as the supreme court states in the first sentence of the case,
the controversy in Hutchison was between former spouses over the custody of a child "born
to the wife before their marriage." 649 P.2d 38,39 (Utah 1982). The supreme court took
special care to note that the husband was not seeking custody of the child as one who had
created a legal relationship with her through adoption by acknowledgment, but rather "as a
third party with whom the child should be placed in the best interest of the child." id. at 42,
n.1. Thus, whereas petitioner enjoyed a legally recognized father-child relationship with
Zachary, the husband in Hutchison did not.
Secondly, the husband in Hutchison did not assert that he stood in loco parentis to
the child, and the supreme court did not address the issue. In this case, the trial court has
found that petitioner stands in loco parentis to Zachary. It is therefore appropriate to apply
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Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), which would confer upon petitioner "the same
rights accorded to natural parents." Id. at 67.
This case, like Bonwich. involves a parent who enjoyed the legal relationship of
parent-child with the child as to whom he seeks custody. Additionally, he stands in loco
parentis to the child. Therefore, this case falls into a class of cases in which the best
interests of the child is not served by application of the presumption. The trial court's
conclusion that respondent benefits from the presumption should be reversed.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING INTERVENOR CUSTODY
RIGHTS IN NICHOLAS
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law appear to award intervenor

custody rights in Nicholas, stating that "Kimberlee and Peter will make school placement
decisions for both boys if the children reside in Oregon," R.2434, at 26, fl 44, and
"Kimberlee / Peter... would have the option of a ten-day period of uninterrupted access to
both boys." Id. at 27,1| 47. Intervenor is not a contestant for custody of Nicholas, and the
parental presumption enjoyed by petitioner and respondent as to Nicholas was not been
rebutted. Therefore the court erred in awarding intervenor any custody rights in Nicholas.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT PRIMARY PHYSICAL
CUSTODY OF NICHOLAS, AND RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR JOINT
LEGAL CUSTODY AND PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF ZACHARY
In its Conclusion of Law No. 2, the court stated: "Respondent is designated the

primary physical custodian of Nicholas." R.2434, at 35, fl 2. The court's award is an abuse
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of discretion because (1) it does not comport with the schedule actually established by the
court, and (2) the court's findings are legally inadequate to support it.
A.

The Court's Designation of Respondent as Primary Physical Custodian
of Nicholas is Inconsistent With Its Award of 50/50 Physical Custody to
Petitioner and Respondent and Should be Vacated

Petitioner and respondent shared 50/50 custody of both Nicholas and Zachary from
the time that they separated in 1999 through the time of trial. The court-appointed custody
evaluator recommended that the 50/50 physical custody schedule continue, and the court
adopted the evaluator's recommendation. R.2434, at 26, U 47. Nevertheless, the court
additionally found that "p]t is in the best interests of Nicholas that respondent be designated
the primary physical custodian of Nicholas." Id. fl 46.
The court's designation of respondent as "primary physical custodian of Nicholas" is
inconsistent with its award of equal time with Nicholas to petitioner and respondent.
"Physical custody" refers to the amount of time that the child lives in his or her parents'
respective homes. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(2). An award of equal physical
custody means that the child spends equal time in each home, and forecloses designation
of a primary physical residence for the child. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1(d) (stating
that joint legal custody is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of physical
custody, as best interests often requires a designation of primary residence); Thronson v.
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428,434 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (award of 57% visitation to mother
provides basis for trial court's identification of mother as having "primary physical custody.").
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In this case, the court found that it was in Nicholas's best interests to spend equal
time with petitioner and respondent and established an equal physical custody schedule
accordingly. Hence neither petitioner nor respondent can be appropriately designated the
primary physical custodian of Nicholas. The court's designation of respondent as primary
physical custodian of Nicholas should be vacated.
B.

The Court's Findings are Legally Insufficient to Support its Award of
Primary Physical Custody of Nicholas to Respondent

Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code mandates that, "[i]n determining any form of
custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child and, among other factors the
court finds relevant, the following: (i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards
of each of the parties; (ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child,
including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent;
and (iii) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (2004).
Our appellate courts have developed additional factors for the trial court's guidance
in defining "the best interests of the child". See Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117,120 (Utah
1986) (identifying function-related factors, including "the stability of the environment
provided by each parent"); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38,41 (Utah 1982) (identifying
factors relating to the child's feeings or special needs and factors relating to the prospective
custodians' character or status or capacity or willingness to function as parents).
In this case, to support its award of 50/50 custody of Nicholas to petitioner and
respondent, the court adopted as its findings the Rule 4-903 factors addressed by the
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custody evaluator. R.2434, fl 34. Based on these findings, and the evaluator's testimony
that Nicholas and Zachary shared unusually equivalent attachments to petitioner and
respondent, R.2534,719:7, and that Nicholas's time with petitioner should not be reduced
below the 50 percent level, id. at 829:18 - 830:12, the court concluded: "It is in the best
interests of Nicholas and Zachary that there be a joint physical custody arrangement" with
the seven-day rotation as to Nicholas, and a somewhat reduced schedule as to Zachary
beginning September 2004. R.2434,1f47.
Petitioner does not dispute the sufficiency of the court's findings to support the
50/50 custody award. However, petitioner does dispute the sufficiency of these findings to
support the award of primary custody to respondent. The findings cannot support a 50/50
physical custody award and also support an award of primary custody to respondent that
permits respondent to remove Nicholas from the state, rendering the 50/50 shared physical
custody arrangement impossible
With respect to the Rule 4-903 factors addressed by the evaluator and adopted by
the court, it is important to note that only two factors appeared to have been weighed in
favor of respondent over petitioner, namely, the benefit of keeping siblings together and the
ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care. With respect to the first factor, the
court found:
Zachary and Nicholas are very best friends and it is likely that their sister,
Madelaine, will join their unusually strong relationship. Madelaine is Nicholas'
half-sister and Zachary's full sister. Those three children should not be
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separated absent some compelling circumstances not present here. There is
a substantial benefit of keeping these siblings together. R.2434, j[ 34.b.
The Utah Supreme Court first articulated a preference for keeping siblings together
as a factor in custody awards in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979). The
parties in Jorgensen had two children during their five-year marriage, a daughter and a son.
The trial court awarded the father custody of the son and the mother custody of the
daughter. The mother appealed, arguing that she should have been awarded custody of
both children. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's custody
determination, holding: "While it is true that a child custody award which keeps all the
children of the marriage united is generally preferred to one which divides them between the
parents, that preference is not binding in the face of considerations dictating a contrary
course of action." jd. at 512.
Subsequently, in Pennington v. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court further qualified the preference, explaining that it does not pertain to
situations in which a child is born after the marriage such that the siblings had not in fact
lived together during the marriage. The court explained: "We have also expressed a
preference to keep siblings together. However, many of the reasons underlying such a
preference are not present in this case. The younger child, Mark, was born months after
entry of the divorce decree. Michael was already in respondent's custody. Except for brief
periods of visitation, the brothers have never lived together. No bonding between them
occurred prior to their parents' divorce." Id. at 256; see also Deeben v. Deeben. 772 P.2d
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972 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirming trial court's award of custody of older child to father,
infant child to mother); Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172,1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(affirming trial court's award of older child to father, infant child to mother and approving trial
court's finding "[t]here is no particular special need created by and bond between siblings,
there being no particular attachment of the sister to the newborn brother at this time").
Thus, the preference for keeping siblings together pertains to siblings of a marriage
who have lived together and formed important sibling relationships. As the Utah Supreme
Court explained, the purpose of the preference is to minimize the "emotional trauma [to a
child] caused by stresses . . . to the bonds between [the child] and his siblings with whom
he has resided for several years." Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d 254,256 (Utah
1985). Where no emotional trauma would result from separation, the preference should be
given no weight. Further, where a child is bom after the marriage is dissolved, to another
marriage, and therefore never united with the children of the marriage, the preference is
inapplicable.
In this case, respondent and intervenor gave birth to an infant daughter, Madelaine,
eight months prior to the trial. The child is not a child of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent, and has never been "united" with Nicholas and Zachary. Nicholas and
Zachary have always been separated from Madelaine to a substantial degree, having only
lived with her part-time while in respondent's care. Thus, the evaluator acknowledged that a
long-distance schedule, similar to the one that she recommended for petitioner should the
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court permit the children to be relocated to Oregon and petitioner chose to remain in Salt
Lake City, would be adequate to maintain the boys' relationship with Madelaine (R.2534, at
858:13 - 859:22). It is legally and factually inappropriate to lump Nicholas and Zachary
together with Madelaine as "three siblings" that should not be separated.
Additionally, with respect to Nicholas and Zachary, the two siblings at issue, the
court's finding is inconsistent with its award, which separates the two boys for several days
a month, though respondent has taken the position that the boys should not be separated.
R.2536, at 1211:15-22; R.27, If 5, and petitioner agrees. To the extent that the court relied
on this factor to conclude that primary custody of Nicholas should be awarded to
respondent, and primary custody of Zachary should be awarded to respondent and
intervenor, the court erred.
The second factor that the court appears to weigh in favor of respondent is the ability
to provide personal rather than surrogate care. As to this factor, the court found:
Both petitioner and respondent can work from home, to a large degree. Their
ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care is generally equal
though the respondent is in a somewhat superior position to provide that
personal care, given her current part-time position. R.2434, if 34.g.
It is unclear whether the court actually weighed this factor in favor of one party or the other,
since it finds that petitioner and respondent's abilities are "generally equal." However, that
statement is followed by the observation that respondent is in a somewhat superior position
to provide personal care, given her current part-time position. The trial court thus equates
respondent's "part-time position" - which is not further defined by the court in terms of hours
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of work required per week - with less need for surrogate care. In fact, that equivalence is
contrary to the only direct evidence adduced at trial regarding the parties' recent use of
surrogate care. Petitioner testified that he used no surrogate care for Nicholas and
Zachary, but was able to care for the children personally in his home without a nanny,
whereas respondent acknowledged the regular use of a nanny in her home for Nicholas and
Zachary. See Ex. R-9; R.2536, at 1204:6 -1207:10; R.2536, at 1262:4; R.2533, at 493:1 495:18. This evidence was uncontroverted. The court abused its discretion to the extent
that it ignored the direct evidence regarding the parties' relative use of surrogate care in
favor of an assumption regarding the need for surrogate care based on an undefined label
of "part-time".
The remaining factors that the court identified and relied upon to support its physical
custody awards, again adopting the custody evaluator's analysis almost verbatim, are set
forth under the heading "Custody" in Findings of Fact 38,39,40,41,42 and 46. These
findings are legally inadequate to support the court's awards. Each is dealt with in turn
below.
1.

Finding of Fact No. 38. The court states that maintaining extended family,

social and academic networks "are of less concern than creating relationship, geographical
and financial stability of the children." The court does not find that petitioner is less able to
create relationship, geographical and financial stability for the children than is respondent or
intervenor. Had the court employed a comparative analysis, geographical stability would
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have weighed in favor of petitioner, who proposed to maintain the children's lifelong home in
Salt Lake City, whereas respondent proposed to relocate the children to Portland. Similarly,
the last sentence of Finding No. 38, that "the boys are in a transportable stage" and "have
the capacity to positively adjust to a permanent move to Oregon" weighs in favor of neither
party because it is not a comparative statement. Had the court employed a comparative
analysis, clearly the boys had the capacity to remain in Salt Lake City, which was already
their permanent home and required no adjustment. To the extent adjustment was required
of the boys by moving, the factor should have weighed against respondent.
2.

Finding of Fact No. 39. The court states that petitioner is capable of

continuing his present employment in Oregon. The court again fails to make a comparative
finding. Since respondent's work is portable, and her employer is headquartered in Salt
Lake City, she is equally able to continue her present employment in Salt Lake City. There
is no record evidence to support the finding that there are job openings for petitioner in
Portland, and the court abused its discretion in so finding, but even so, the finding favors
neither petitioner nor respondent since the court does not find that respondent would have
less job opportunity in Salt Lake City than respondent would have in Portland.
3.

Finding of Fact No. 40. In this finding, the court states that it is likely that

intervenor would experience a significant reduction in income if he were to move to Utah.
This finding, standing alone, does not favor respondent or petitioner. The court does not
find that such a reduction in income would adversely impact the children. To the contrary,
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the court's Finding No. 52 makes clear that intervenor could experience a 50% reduction in
income, and nevertheless respondent and intervenor would enjoy household income
exceeding $100,000 per year. Intervenor could make no income, and respondent and
intervenor would still enjoy household income the equivalent of petitioner's. Additionally,
Finding No. 53 states that, without assistance from intervenor, respondent has adequate
resources to support Nicholas without child support from petitioner. Given these findings,
whether intervenor experiences a significant reduction in income or not is irrelevant to the
Nicholas's best interests and should favor neither respondent nor petitioner. Instead,
intervener's choice to maximize his income by remaining in Oregon is simply an individual
choice that does not bear on the custody question, except to the extent that it demonstrates
a lack of willingness on intervener's part to sacrifice his own interests in order to be present
on a daily basis for the children.
The statement that it would be far more burdensome for respondent and intervenor
to move to Salt Lake City than for petitioner to move to Portland is in the same vein, having
no bearing on the children's best interests. It is instead simply a conclusory statement that
preferences respondent and intervener's desire to live in Oregon over petitioner's desire to
live in Salt Lake City, revealing a value judgment that intervener's desire to maximize his
income is more important than petitioner's desire to remain in the city where he was born
and raised, and where he enjoys close contact with extensive family, as well as social,
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community, and religious networks. Assuming no improper motive, the court should not
weigh the parties' preference at all, except as the preference will impact the children.
Additionally, respondent's testimony is that intervenor traveled to Salt Lake City once
a month to stay with respondent and the children in respondent's home here, and that she
herself lived half-time in her home here. It is difficult to understand how it would be
burdensome for her to "move" to where she already lived, albeit half-time.
4.

Finding of Fact No. 41. This finding is conclusory and contrary to the dictates

of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10, which mandates that the court consider "the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1 )(a)(i).
It does not weigh in favor of any of the parties.
5.

Finding of Fact No. 42. In this finding, the court recites numerous subsidiary

findings relating to respondent, none of which are comparative in nature or otherwise
advance the analysis of whether petitioner or respondent is the better choice of custodial
parent. The first two sentences restate the bias that biology is the pivotal factor in
determining custody, equating respondent's biological relationship with "all three" children though only two children are the subject of evaluation - with "the strongest inherent
responsibility" for the children. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that biology
creates the strongest "inherent responsibility" for a child, as this case demonstrates:
Intervener's biological tie to Zachary prompted no action on his part for two years. In any
event, speculation regarding "inherent responsibility" has no place in a custody
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determination, which should be focused instead on the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the prospective custodians vis-a-vis the children's best interests,
assessed by reference to actual conduct.
The remaining statements are not comparative and can be equally applied to
petitioner as to respondent, i.e., petitioner has obeyed the court's orders, petitioner has
facilitated respondent's relationship with the boys, petitioner has established a stable home
life in Salt Lake City - of longer duration and greater breadth of associations than the home
life established by respondent in Oregon - which fully incorporates Nicholas and Zachary,
and petitioner has chosen to establish a life for himself in Salt Lake City with logic and
reason.
The statement that respondent has borne the bulk of discomfort associated with
obeying the court's temporary custody order is not tied to the children's best interests, and
fails to recognize that the "discomfort" results from intervener's choice to remain in Portland
for the three years that this matter was pending prior to trial, though the children lived in Salt
Lake City.
The finding that respondent would have to work outside the home to increase her
earning potential does not bear on the custody determination in any discernible way.
Finally, the statement that the children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and
are very comfortable in that environment is not comparative, and again, would favor
petitioner if it were comparative since Salt Lake City was the children's primary home at the
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time of trial, was the place where Zachary had lived all his life, and was the place Nicholas
had lived nearly all his life.
6.

Finding of Fact No. 46. This finding is conclusory as to the best interests of

Nicholas and Zachary. As to the statement that "it is undisputed that the parties will
relocate and will live within 100 miles of one another," the finding favors neither petitioner
nor respondent because it does not identify which party or parties will relocate. More
importantly, it is improper for the court to "test parental attachments or to risk detriment to
the 'best interest' of the minor children" on the basis of testimony that a proposed move will
or will not occur. See In re Marriage of Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th 25,45 n.7 (S. Ct.1996). "Nor
should either parent be confronted with Solomonic choices over custody of minor children."
Id.; see also Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719,727 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting that
mother testified she would not move if it meant losing custody of her children, but
nevertheless adhering to a best interests analysis based on her stated intention to move).
Petitioner testified that he believes it is in the children's best interests to remain in
Salt Lake City with him. At the same time, he testified that if the court were to permit the
children to be relocated to Portland, then he would follow. Like most primary parents, he
would make whatever sacrifices are necessary to maintain his involvement in his children's
lives. It was improper for the court to rely on this testimony to essentially force petitioner to
move or lose 50/50 custody, after having found that the children's best interests required
joint physical custody. Such an approach short circuits the best interests analysis
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altogether, risks detriment to the child, and awards custody on the basis of the convenience
of adults - or, worse, awards custody on the basis of unwillingness to move to
accommodate the children's needs - factors only negatively related to the children's best
interests.
The findings as a whole, and the evaluation upon which they are based, rely on
improper biases that have no legal foundation in the statutory or case law that governs
custody disputes. For instance, Dr. Jill Sanders testified that she would not have
distinguished between Nicholas and Zachary in her recommendations as to name change,
or legal and physical custody, had it not been for the biological factor. R.2534,872:5-17.
Yet nowhere does she connect her view of the importance of biology to the best interests of
Nicholas and Zachary, other than by general, conclusory and speculative statements.
Without evidence that the biological relationship between a particular child and a particular
adult in a particular case impacts on the child's best interests in an identifiable way, it should
not be a factor in the best interests determination. The biological relationship between
parent and child is legally protected by the parental presumption, and should not be further
elevated in the best interests analysis.
It was also Dr. Jill Sanders' view, which informed in part her recommendation that
petitioner should move to Oregon - a recommendation adopted in whole by the trial court that the LDS culture was a negative factor for Zachary (R.2535, at 881:15- 882:11). This
was because, in Dr. Sanders' view, the LDS culture is particularly conservative and would
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stigmatize Zachary because of the circumstances of his conception and birth. Id- It is
improper and inappropriate for such biases on the part of an evaluator to play any role in the
determination of custody. It cannot be said that Dr. Sanders' biased view of the LDS culture
did not play such a role in this case, given the inadequacy of the findings to support her
conclusory recommendation that petitioner move to Oregon.
The trial court's award of primary custody of Nicholas to respondent, which adopts
Dr. Sanders' recommendations, should be reversed.
C.

The Findings of Fact are Legally Insufficient to Support the Court's
Award of Joint Legal and Primary Physical Custody of Zachary to
Intervenor and Respondent

The court concluded that respondent was entitled to the benefit of the parental
presumption vis-a-vis petitioner in their competing claims for custody of Zachary. Petitioner
disputes the correctness of this legal conclusion for the myriad reasons set forth earlier in
this brief. The court made no findings of fact that support a determination that, absent the
parental presumption, custody of Zachary should be awarded to intervenor and respondent
based on Zachary's best interests. Instead, the court's custody award of Zachary flows
from its application of the parental presumption against petitioner, and its conclusion that
petitioner is a "non-parent" of Zachary, the evidence being clear that Nicholas and Zachary
should not otherwise have been separated. If this court determines that the trial court erred
in its application of the parental presumption against petitioner, the court should direct that
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the 50/50 custody applicable for Nicholas be reinstated for Zachary forthwith during the
pendency of any further proceedings.
D.

The Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Making Findings Regarding
Key Factors Relative to the Children's Best Interests in this Case

The court failed to make findings on several factors mandated by the legislature
and/or of significance in this case, including: (1) the relative ability of the parties to provide
continuity of environment and stability for the children; (2) the identity of the party who acted
as the primary caretaker for the children during the marriage; (3) the relative strength of the
children's bonds with each of the parties; (4) the past conduct and demonstrated moral
standards of each of the parties; and (5) the identity of the party who has most consistently
elevated the children's best interests above his or her own interests. The record is replete
with evidence pertaining to these factors. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to
make appropriate findings based on this evidence, and awarding custody instead on the
basis of biology and other improper factors. The trial court's custody award should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should (1) reverse the trial court's order
granting intervenor standing to establish paternity of Zachary, (2) reverse the trial court's
denial of petitioner's motion for summary judgment barring respondent and intervenor from
challenging Zachary's paternity; (3) and reverse the trial court's custody awards based on
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the improper presence of intervenor in this case, the improper application of the parental
presumption against petitioner, and the trial court's inadequate findings of fact.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KELLY F. PEARSON,

:

Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

vs.

:

KIMBERLEE Y. PEARSON,

:

Respondent.

:

CASE NO.

004907881

PETER D. THANOS,
Intervenor.
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on April 1,
2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2004.

Petitioner was present and represented by

Paige Bigelow, respondent was present and represented by Steven H.
Gunn,

and

Williams.

intervenor

was

present

and

represented

by

Kellie

The Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses,

having considered

the

evidence presented

and the argument of

counsel, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
To the extent any of the following Findings of Fact should be
considered

as Conclusions of Law, they shall be considered a

Conclusion of Law.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Fact and Procedural History
1.

Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, were married

on August 17, 1992 and were divorced on June 5, 2002 by a Decree
which

terminated

visitation

issues

their

marriage,

for

later

but

reserved

disposition.

custody

and

Petitioner

and

respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, conceived a child that was born on
July 6, 1997, named Nicholas Browning Pearson.
2.

Also during their marriage, respondent, Kimberlee Thanos,

conceived a child, Zachary Andrew Pearson ("Zachary") , who was born
on September 14, 1999.

However, approximately four months after

respondent,

Thanos,

Kimberlee

became

pregnant

with

Zachary,

respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, informed petitioner that intervenor,
Pete Thanos, was Zachary's natural father. Approximately two weeks
after

Zachary's

birth,

respondent,

Kimberlee

Thanos,

and

intervenor, Pete Thanos, again informed petitioner that intervenor,
Pete Thanos, was Zachary's father.
3.
results

Intervenor, Pete Thanos, obtained DNA paternity test
which

he

later

filed

with

the District

Court.

The

paternity index for intervenor is 98011 and the probability of
paternity is 99.999%.
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Respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, filed various affidavits

with the Court, commencing January 2001, stating under oath that
intervenor, Pete Thanos, was the natural father of the minor child.
5.

Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, separated

when Zachary was nine months of age. In his first filed Affidavit,
petitioner acknowledged that respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, had
become pregnant with Zachary and disclosed to petitioner that
Zachary was intervenor, Pete Thanos' son and not petitioner's
biological child.
pleadings.

Other like statements are contained in various

In his Affidavit dated September 28, 2001, petitioner

admitted that he was aware that intervenor, Pete Thanos, was the
child's biological father, although he alleged that he was the
child's "psychological" parent. In paragraph 15 of that affidavit,
petitioner acknowledged that he does not advocate secrecy regarding
the

biological

facts

of

Zachary's

conception

acknowledging that Pete is the biological father).

(implicitly
In paragraph

16, page 11 of that document, petitioner states that, "I have at
all times known that he [Zachary] was conceived of Mr. Thanos."
6.

At

the

time

of

Zachary's

conception

and

birth,

intervenor, Pete Thanos, was married to another woman. Intervenor,
Pete Thanos' prior wife

died

from cancer

in December,

2000.

Intervenor, Pete Thanos, has set forth in his affidavits and in
argument that he did not inform his prior wife of Zachary's birth
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because he did not want to further damage her already fragile
health or cause her further emotional trauma, and that he wished to
remain with her to assist her through her final months of life.
Based on intervener's affidavits, it appears that out of compassion
for his then-wife, intervenor did not file a paternity action
regarding Zachary until after her death.
7.
and

Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, separated

later

divorced.

As

part

of

their divorce

action,

they

stipulated to a temporary order which granted them joint legal
physical custody of Zachary and his brother Nicholas.

Intervenor,

Pete Thanos, and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, continued their
relationship, and married

on July 1, 2 002, after the Pearson

divorce was finalized.
8.

The respondent and intervenor have since had a child as

issue of their marriage, namely Madelaine, whose date of birth is
July 13, 2003.

Respondent and intervenor purchased a home in

Oregon in July of 2001.

Intervenor has at all times since the

filing of his Motion for Intervention and Petition for Paternity
been a resident of the State of Oregon.
9.

Beginning in February, 2001, intervenor, Pete Thanos, had

ongoing contact with Zachary, which included day long visits and
periods

of

vacation,

although

he

was

precluded

from

having

overnight visits until he married respondent, Kimberlee Thanos.
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The contact has been frequent and consistent since February 2001.
As

the

petitioner

and

respondent

share

joint

custody,

the

respondent has been traveling to Utah from Oregon for her parent
time with Nicholas and Zachary, and has maintained a home in Utah
for that purpose and also the children, Nicholas and Zachary, are
transported

to

Oregon

during

the

respondent's

parent

time.

Madelaine typically accompanies respondent on her trips to Utah,
petitioner has not remarried and resides in Salt Lake City.
10.

The current access schedule is one week/one week rotation

with transitions occurring on Friday mornings.

The respondent

flies from Portland, Oregon with Madelaine and then returns to her
home with

intervenor

in Oregon

and, again, with

Zachary

and

Nicholas as frequently as possible.
11.

As to the procedural history of this case, at the time of

hearing before Commissioner Evans on the Motion to Intervene on
August 30, 2001, the Commissioner analyzed the case of State of
Utah in the Interest of J.W.F, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), known as
the Schoolcraft case, and recommended that intervenor, Pete Thanos1
Motion to Intervene be denied.
intervenor,

Pete

Thanos,

The Commissioner reasoned that

lacked

standing

to

challenge

the

presumption of paternity that existed in favor of petitioner, given
the consideration that should be given to preserving the stability
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of marriage and to ensure that the children are protected from
disruptive and unnecessary attacks on their paternity.
12.

After briefing and argument of the case on December 3,

2001, an Order on Objection to Recommendation was entered by this
Court.

At the time of the initial hearing, this Court found that

the criteria outlined in the case of In re: J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990)

("the Schoolcraft case") apply to this case and set

forth the framework to determine whether intervenor, Pete Thanos1
Motion to Intervene should be granted.
13.

The

Court

found

that

in order to determine

whether

intervenor, Pete Thanos, had standing to intervene to establish
Zachary's paternity and to rebut the presumption that Zachary was
the legitimate son of petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos,
the

Court

must

Schoolcraft.
preserving
children

consider

the

policies

set

forth

in

The two-prong analysis of Schoolcraft included (1)

the
from

paternity.

first

stability
disruptive

The

Court

of

the

and

found

marriage

and

unnecessary
that

the

(2)

attacks

second

of

protecting
on
the

their
policy

considerations—protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary
attacks—was most applicable in this particular case, but that the
record

was

insufficient

to

adequately

address

that

policy

consideration as it applied to the circumstances in this case.

14.
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The Court found that the affidavit of Dr. Goldsmith was

not case-specific and was of little help to the Court in this
regard.

Therefore, in order for the Court to adequately address

the second Schoolcraft policy consideration, the Court appointed
Dr.

Jill

Sanders

evaluation.
previously

to

provide

an

independent

"Schoolcraft"

Petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, had
stipulated

to

evaluation in this matter.

Dr.

Sanders

conducting

the

custody

The Court then reserved judgment on

intervenor, Pete Thanos1 standing in order to allow Dr. Sanders to
conduct a separate preliminary evaluation.
15.

As

proffered

at

the

time

of

hearing

before

the

Commissioner and stated in pleadings and as set forth in the
affidavits
resemblance

of
to

respondent

and

intervenor

intervenor

was

such

that

recognize that intervenor was his father.

Zachary's
Zachary

physical

would

soon

Further, the biological

relationship between Zachary and intervenor, Pete Thanos, cannot
and should not be hidden from the child, as intervenor, Pete
Thanos, will continue to be an integral part of Zachary's life.
Respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, and intervenor, Pete Thanos, have an
intact

family unit

to provide

care

and

security to Zachary.

Further, petitioner and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, have, in one
form or another, informed dozens of individuals in their circle of
family, friends and acquaintances that intervenor, Pete Thanos, is
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Zachary1s biological father. It is impossible to keep the "secret"
of Zachary's parentage hidden from him.
16.

Dr. Sanders submitted an evaluation report to the Court

and counsel dated May 13, 2002.

Dr. Sanders1 summary opinion was

that from a developmental and psychological prospective, Zachary's
functioning

was

not

Thanos' involvement.

inherently

disrupted

by

intervenor,

Pete

Further, Dr. Sanders found that intervenor,

Pete Thanos' relationship with Zachary was not only not disruptive,
but was necessary to Zachary's normal and positive development.
17.

In addition, Dr. Sanders noted that respondent, Kimberlee

Thanos, and intervenor, Pete Thanos, planned to marry and that if
they did marry, intervenor, Pete Thanos, would, at the least, have
a role as stepfather, and that his status as Zachary's biological
father inherently escalates the importance of the relationship
between Zachary and intervenor.
relationship

As Dr. Sanders reported, the

between parents and their biological

children is

psychologically extremely important. Dr. Sanders reported that the
most satisfying type of relationship between a child and his
biological

parent

is

generally

a

personal

one,

that

the

relationship between intervenor and Zachary is essential to Zachary
and that no one can play this role in Zachary's life except
intervenor, Pete Thanos. Dr. Sanders also stated that, based upon
the quality of the relationship between Zachary and intervenor and
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the likelihood that intervenor, Pete Thanos, and Zachary would have
continuing extensive contact, their attachment would be likely to
deepen and become more significant over time.

Dr. Sanders opined

that if petitioner was not interested in continuing to parent
Zachary, he would likely develop a full father/son attachment to
intervenor,

Pete Thanos, because

Zachary was

still young and

because intervenor and Zachary have had contact since Zachary's
infancy.
18.

Upon receipt of the report, petitioner did not object to

the report, nor did he object to the Court receiving the report.
Instead, petitioner requested further clarification with regard to
the Schoolcraft evaluation by Dr. Sanders. Pursuant to a telephone
conference requested by petitioner on May 28, 2002, the Court
permitted petitioner to supplement his concerns and address the
Court with a letter outlining his concerns and his further requests
regarding Dr. Sanders' further analysis. Based upon petitioner's
motion and letter, the Court directed Dr. Sanders to make further
analysis, to-wit: the impact on the child of a disruption in
Zachary's relationship with petitioner, and Zachary's ability to
understand
19.

his biological relationship.
In response, Dr. Sanders submitted a supplemental report

dated August

26, 2002.

Dr. Sanders

found

that

the

primary

disruption in Zachary's relationship with petitioner occurred at
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the parties1 separation when Zachary was approximately nine months
of age.

Dr. Sanders concluded that by age 18 months Zachary was

firmly established in a loving, secure, and relatively predictable
relationship
Sanders

with petitioner, respondent

indicated

that

there

was

no

and

intervenor.

inherent

reason

Dr.
why

intervenor's presence as another loving caregiver should have any
further disruptive impact.
20.

In addition, Dr. Sanders stated that she did not believe

that Zachary had lost his relationship with petitioner or that
there was a basis
relationship

to believe

between

Zachary

that

further disruption

and petitioner

was

to the

intrinsically

linked to intervenor, Pete Thanos' presence in Zachary!s life. Dr.
Sanders found that given Zachary's cognitive ability at the age of
3, Zachary can understand simple descriptions of biological facts
of his parentage in the same way that a three-year-old adopted
child can understand the biological facts of his or her parentage.
She indicated that the emotional meaning of these relationships is
unlikely to have much impact on Zachary for quite some time.
Again, Dr. Sanders noted that Zachary has a loving relationship
with petitioner and with intervenor.
21.

After considering

both of Dr. Sanders' reports, the

criteria applicable to the facts in this case, and the Schoolcraft
criteria, the Court previously found that it was appropriate to

sustain
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intervenorfs

objection

to

the

recommendation

Commissioner Evans and grant the Motion to Intervene.

of

The Court

found that Dr. Sanders had very carefully articulated, to the
Court's satisfaction, the policy considerations that the Court must
make and find under Schoolcraft.
prong

of

the

Schoolcraft

As previously found, the first

analysis—relating

to preserving

the

stability of the marriage—was not a consideration in this case, due
to the fact that there was no marriage between petitioner and
respondent,

Kimberlee

Thanos, to be preserved,

and

that

the

stability was shattered when the parties separated when Zachary was
approximately nine months of age.

The Court also noted that

intervenor, Pete Thanos, and respondent, Kimberlee Thanos, are now
married.

Further, pursuant to the report of Dr. Sanders intervenor

has established a relationship with Zachary, and there was nothing
that would be adverse to the best interests of the child or
disruptive to him and the Court previously found it was in the best
interest

of

Zachary

Findings

of

Fact

to allow Pete Thanos to

and

Conclusions

of

Law

in

intervene.

The

Re: Motion

for

Intervention and Order Granting Intervention of Intervenor, Pete
Thanos, were signed by the Court November 7, 2002.
22.

On October 10, 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to

Bifurcate, to Stay Proceedings, and to Set Date for Response to
Motion for Summary Judgment.

That matter came on for hearing
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before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on November 1, 2002, and an
Order on Motion to Bifurcate and to Stay Proceedings was signed
December 16, 2002.
23.

On November 12, 2002, the petitioner filed an Answer to

the Intervenor's Verified Petition for Paternity.,
24.

The petitioner filed another Motion for Stay

Expedited Disposition on or about November 20, 2002.

and For
That was

heard by the Court on November 27, 2002, and denied by the Court
and the Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Stay Order was signed
December 20, 2002.
25.

On November 15, 2002, Pete Thanos, as intervenor in the

divorce action, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with a
supporting memorandum and Affidavit, seeking a declaration by the
Court that intervenor, Pete Thanos, is Zachary's biological father.
26.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Stay with the Utah

Court of Appeals on or about November 27, 2 002, requesting that the
Court of Appeals stay the paternity and custody proceedings in the
District Court pending resolution of the petitioner's Petition for
Extraordinary

Relief.

Petitioner

filed

his

Petition

Extraordinary Relief with the Utah Supreme Court on

for

or about

November 14, 2002, and the matter was transferred to the Utah Court
of Appeals by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, given the
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The petitioner's Motion for Stay was summarily denied

by the Utah Court of Appeals by an Order dated December 4, 2002.
27.

The petitioner also filed an Objection to Admissibility

of Genetic Test Results and Motion to Strike, dated November 27,
2002.

Intervenor filed his Response to Objection to Admissibility

of Genetic Tests on December 9, 2 002, and amended the same due to
an error in the title of said pleading on December 23, 2002.
28.
Motion

On or about December 9, 2002, the petitioner filed a

for

Summary

Judgment

and

Memorandum

in Opposition

to

Intervener's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and In Support of
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Petitioner requested in

his Motion for Summary Judgment that he be declared the legal
*£&ther of Zachary on the basis of his controlling presumption of
paternity or, alternatively,

on the basis of the equitable parent

doctrine or, alternatively, barring intervenor and respondent from
challenging Zachary's parentage on the basis of equitable estoppel.
29.
response

Subsequent to receiving the respondent and intervener's
to

the

Petitioner's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment,

Petitioner filed a reply memorandum and affidavits of Douglas
Goldsmith and Kelly Pearson.

Intervenor filed motions to strike

the affidavits and petitioner filed a responsive memorandum thereto
to which

intervenor

replied.

The petitioner's

Objection

to

Admissibility of Genetic Test Results and Motion to Strike and the
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heard

simultaneous

with

intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and petitioner's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
30.

After hearing on intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment and petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court
found that Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-105 (b), establishes
concurrent jurisdiction between the District Court and the Juvenile
Court in an action to establish paternity.
a paternity action.

This case is, in part,

The Court found, however, that this is not a

termination of parental rights action which precludes the District
Court from exercising jurisdiction.
31.

Subsequent to the Court's consideration of all arguments

made by petitioner, respondent and intervenor, an Order on Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment and Order Denying Petitioner's Motion
for Summary Judgment was entered by the Court on May 8, 2003.
Intervenor was declared to be the biological and natural father of
Zachary Andrew Pearson on May 8, 2003, and the petitioner's Motion
for Summary Judgment, dated December 9, 2002, was denied.
32.

The petitioner filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal

Interlocutory Orders on or about May 28, 2003, with the Utah Court
of Appeals. On July 3, 2003, the Petition for Permission to Appeal
was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals.
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Custody Evaluation
33.

Dr. Jill Sanders completed her child custody evaluation

and a settlement conference was held before Commissioner Michael S.
Evans, the parties and Dr. Sanders on August 13, 2003.

That did

not result in a settlement of this matter and a final report was
issued by Dr. Sanders dated November 3, 2003.
34.

Dr. Jill Sanders is a licensed psychologist who this

Court finds is a qualified expert in the performance of custody
evaluations and is well respected and recognized in the community
for that expertise. Dr. Sanders, prior to issuing her final report
of November 3, 2003, conducted multiple interviews, a battery of
psychological testing and reviewed documents presented to her by
the parties and their counsel, and contacted collaterals as she
deemed appropriate.

The Court finds that Dr. Sanders' child

custody evaluation was thoroughly performed and that the report
issued complied with and addressed the requirements of Rule 4-903
of the Code of Judicial Administration.

Pursuant to that Rule and

the requirements that the evaluator consider and, therefore, which
the Court should consider, the Court finds the following:
a.

Nicholas and Zachary are too young to consider the

child's preference.
b.

Zachary and Nicholas are very best friends and it is

likely that their sister, Madelaine, will join their unusually
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full-sister.

Those

FINDINGS Sc CONCLUSIONS

is Nicholas'
three

half-sister

children

should

and

not

be

separated absent some compelling circumstances not present here.
There is a substantial benefit of keeping these siblings together.
c.

Nicholas and Zachary have excellent relationships

with petitioner, respondent and intervenor.
d.

The petitioner and respondent have established a

50/50 parent time arrangement with Nicholas and Zachary, which has
worked relatively well.
e.

Petitioner, respondent and intervenor all are of

high moral character and exhibit strong emotional stability.
f.

Petitioner,

respondent

and intervenor

exhibited a deep desire for custody of the children.

each have
Contrary to

the allegations and representations of the petitioner, intervenor
has stepped in to assume the role of parent to Zachary and did so
although delayed, given the circumstances present in this case.
g.
home.

The intervenor is employed full-time out of the

Respondent

is

employed

petitioner is employed full-time.

in

a

part-time

position

and

Both petitioner and respondent

can work from home, to a large degree.

Their ability to provide

personal rather than surrogate care is generally equal though the
respondent

is in a somewhat superior position to provide that

personal care, given her current part-time position.
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None of the parties exhibit significant impairment

of ability to function as a parent due to drug abuse, excessive
drinking or other related causes.
i.
Church.

The petitioner is a practicing member of the LDS

Respondent is no longer a practicing member of the LDS

Church.

The

respondent

Zacharyfs

participation

and

intervenor

in religious

support

training

Nicholas

and

and activities.

Religious compatibility is not of substantial importance in this
case.
j.

The

biological parents.

petitioner

and

respondent

are

Nicholas'

The respondent and intervenor are Zachary's

biological parents; however, Nicholas and Zachary have a strong
attachment to both intervenor and petitioner.
k.

All three parties have the capacity financially to

support these children.
1.

There is no evidence of abuse of either of the

children or of any domestic violence involving the children.
Parental Presumption
35.

The Parental Presumption recognizes the natural right and

authority of a parent to the child's custody where one party to the
controversy

is a non-parent.

The Parental

Presumption

is a

rebuttable presumption and can be rebutted by evidence establishing
that a particular parent at a particular time generally lacked all
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three of the characteristics that give rise to the presumption: (1)
that no strong mutual bond exists; (2) that the parent has not
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest and
welfare for the child; and (3) that the parent lacks the sympathy
for and understanding
parents generally.

of the child that

is characteristic

Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P. 2d 38

of

(Utah

1982) .
There

is no

Parental

Presumption as to Nicholas

because

petitioner and respondent are both the natural parents of Nicholas.
Therefore, a best interests analysis as to Nicholas is controlling.
The

Parental

Presumption

has

application

to

petitioner's

respondent's and intervener's claims for custody of Zachary. As to
Zachary, between petitioner and respondent and intervenor, it has
been established beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner is not
the biological parent of Zachary. Consequently, the presumption of
legitimacy regarding Zachary, who was born during the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, has been rebutted.

Based upon the

evidence as set forth in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, petitioner cannot and has not established that respondent at
any time had no strong mutual bond with Zachary, that respondent at
any time has not demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice her own
interests and welfare for Zachary, or that at any time respondent
lacked the sympathy

for and understanding of

Zachary that is
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characteristic of parents generally.

In fact, the Court finds the

opposite to be true, that respondent and Zachary have a strong
mutual bond, that she has sacrificed her interests and welfare for
Zachary, and has an abundance of sympathy and understanding of
Zachary that is characteristic of parents generally.

Respondent

benefits from the Parental Presumption on her claim for custody of
Zachary

against

petitioner.

Consequently,

petitioner are not on equal footing.

respondent

and

The Parental Presumption has

been rebutted regarding intervener's claim for custody of Zachary.
During

approximately

the

first

15 months

of

Zachary's

life,

intervenor, with the assistance of petitioner and respondent, kept
intervener's parentage of Zachary a secret resulting in minimal
contact between Zachary and intervenor during this period.
this critical

During

15 month period of time, intervenor and Zachary

generally did not have a strong mutual bond, during this time
intervenor generally did not demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice
his own interests and welfare for Zachary, and generally lacked the
sympathy for and understanding of Zachary that is characteristic of
parents generally. Therefore, petitioner and intervenor stand on
equal footing and Zachary's custody between them is determined
solely by the best interests of the child.

In the context of the

Parental Presumption Analysis, it is ironic at best to conclude
that petitioner is a non-parent of Zachary when in real terms
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has established

relationship with Zachary, albeit in
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loco

parentis.

and

The Utah

Supreme Court deemed Mr. Hutchison to be a "non-parent" in its
analysis and Mr. Hutchison's parental relationship was of longer
duration than petitioner's in the present case.

649 P.2d at 39.

Consequently, following the dictates of the Hutchison case and in
furtherance of the policies which support the Parental Presumption,
this Court ruled accordingly.
Petitioner's Experts
36.

Dr. Douglas Goldsmith's testimony is of little assistance

or weight in the Court's determination of custody.

Dr. Goldsmith

has not met with the respondent, intervenor or children nor has he
conducted a custody evaluation.

His testimony is generic and not

case specific and the Court finds that Dr. Goldsmith misapprehends
Dr.

Sanders' opinions

regarding

relationships to children.

the

importance

of

biological

In particular, Dr. Goldsmith has no

factual basis with which to offer an opinion regarding whether Dr.
Sanders' recommendations regarding custody of Zachary Pearson are
potentially damaging to Zachary.
37.

The testimony of Dr. Heather Walker is of no benefit to

the Court. The petitioner offers her as an expert in an effort to
discredit or call into question the quality and methodology of the
evaluation of Dr. Sanders.

The Court is not persuaded by Dr.
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Walker's testimony that Dr. Sanders' recommendations, opinions or
conclusions are not consistent with the data or not within the
scope of her expertise.

This Court is not persuaded that Dr.

Sanders' statements and opinions are not supported by current
psychological literature, though the Court believes that is of
little weight in this Court's determination of custody.

The Court

is not persuaded by Dr. Walker that Dr. Sanders' methods are not
consistent with the guidelines for conducting custody evaluations.
Dr.

Sanders has performed

her evaluation

consistent

with the

guidelines and Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
The Court finds that Dr. Sanders has assigned appropriate weight to
the

best

interests

recommendations
according

to

and has

the

children

conducted

in

her

evaluation

a child-centered

to the guidelines and consistent

literature.
Court

of

and

evaluation

with the data and

Nothing in the testimony of Dr. Walker leads this
believe

that

a

different

result,

conclusion

or

recommendation would be made in the event that another evaluator
evaluated this matter. Indeed, Dr. Sanders has a long history with
this case, having been involved with the parties and children for
a period of time between April, 2002 and November 3, 2003.
Custody
38.

The Court finds that there are some benefits to the

children remaining in Salt Lake City, due to the social, family and

9lHSi
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academic networks. However, given the ages of the children and the
other considerations, as set forth in these findings, maintaining
extended family, social and academic networks are of less concern
than creating relationship, geographical and financial stability of
the children at this point in their development.

Both boys are in

a transportable stage and the Court finds that they

have the

capacity positively to adjust to a permanent move to Oregon.
39.
relocate.

The Court

cannot order any party to this action to

Although

the

respondent's

current

employer

is

headquartered in Salt Lake City, she works from home and so her
employment

is portable.

She works

Petitioner also works from his home.

from her home

in Oregon.

He is capable of continuing

his present employment, if he were to move to Oregon.

In addition,

there are job openings in Portland for individuals who have skillslike those possessed by petitioner.
40.

The intervenor is the primary financial provider for the

Thanos family.

Unlike petitioner and respondent he could not

continue to work for his present employer if he were to move to
Salt Lake City.

It is likely that if he were to move to Utah he

would experience a significant reduction in income.

It would be

far more burdensome for respondent and intervenor to move to Salt
Lake City, than for petitioner to move to Portland.
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In making a custody determination in this matter it is

appropriate to rely on present realities and focus on what is in
the best interest of the children today.

It is not helpful to rely

on historical issues or to assign fault for the breakup of the
Pearson marriage.
42.

The respondent is pivotal in this case in that she is the

biological mother of both boys and their sister, Madelaine.

The

respondent has the strongest inherent responsibility for all three
of these children.

At considerable inconvenience to herself and

her husband respondent has obeyed the Court orders currently in
place and borne the bulk of the physical, emotional and financial
discomfort associated with it.

She has performed in an exemplary

manner in facilitating the petitioner's relationship with both
boys.

At the same time, she has established a stable home life in

Oregon with intervenor and with their child Madelaine, which fully
incorporates both Nicholas and Zachary.

Further, intervenor has

fully accepted and supported both boys and their relationship with
petitioner.

The respondent has chosen to establish a life for

herself and her family in Oregon and she has done so with logic and
reason.

In order for her to increase her earning potential she

would have to work outside the home and to hire daycare providers
to take care of her three small children.

It is not in the best

interest of any of the children to require her to do so, the more
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so since her present income is comparable to that of petitioner.
The children consider Oregon to be one of their homes and are very
comfortable in that environment.
43.

There is a sufficient level of trust between petitioner

and the Thanoses in that all three are excellent parents which is
a view generally shared by each party. Communications between them
at times are tense.

However, in the past and currently they have

consistently reached a consensus concerning decisions relating to
the upbringing of the boys.

A joint legal custody relationship

therefore does appear to be feasible and in the best interest of
Nicholas and Zachary as further defined below.
44.

It is in the best interests of Nicholas that joint legal

custody of Nicolas be awarded to petitioner and respondent, and
that joint legal custody of Zachary be awarded to respondent and
intervenor.

Joint legal custody shall be further defined as set

forth at page 12, paragraph numbered 1, of the Child Custody
Evaluation, as follows:
1. Legal Custody. Kimberlee and Peter should be named
joint legal custodians of Zachary. Kimberlee and Kelly
should be named joint legal custodians of Nicholas.
Kelly's special relationship with Zachary should be
legally protected in the form of third party access with
the responsibility to make daily decisions on Zachary's
behalf when Zachary is in his care. Kimberlee and Peter
will make school placement decisions for both boys if the
children reside in Oregon. Both biological parents of
each child must agree upon any elective medical or dental
treatment. It would be best if decisions regarding any
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extracurricular activities would be jointly made by all
three parents so that the boys1 schedules are manageable.
If this is not possible, Kelly and Kimberlee will jointly
decide on Nicholas1 activities and Kimberlee and Peter
will jointly decide on Zachary's activities.
45.

The following factors support the conclusion that joint

legal custody of the boys divided between petitioner and respondent
for Nicholas and between respondent and intervenor for Zachary is
in the boys' best interest!
a.

The emotional needs of the children will be met by

joint legal custody.

A generally positive decision making process

has always existed between the parties and they have managed quite
well at keeping the children out of the fray.
b.

The parenting skills and abilities of all three

parents are excellent and complimentary.
c.

All three parties have similar major values and they

recognize the importance of each other in the children's lives.
d.

The primary physical custody of Nicholas is awarded

to respondent.

The primary physical custody of Zachary is awarded

to respondent and intervenor.
petitioner's

testimony

All of the evidence, including

indicates

that petitioner will move to

Oregon. Therefore, all three parties will live in close proximity
to one another, which makes joint legal custody workable.
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This legal custody determination is consistent with

the custody evaluation, said custody evaluation is incorporated
herein in full by this reference.
46.

It is in the best interests of Nicholas that respondent

be designated the primary physical custodian of Nicholas and that
she not be required to obtain petitioner's permission to move to
Oregon.

It is in the best interest of Zachary that respondent and

intervenor be designated the primary physical custodians of Zachary
and that they not be required to obtain petitioner's permission to
move to Oregon.
order

any

party

It should be noted that while the Court cannot
to

move

to

another

state,

the

evidence

is

undisputed that the parties will relocate and will live within 100
miles of one another because it is in the best interests and needs
of Nicholas and Zachary to live in close proximity to petitioner,
respondent and intervenor.
47.

It is in the best interests of Nicholas and Zachary that

there be a joint physical custody arrangement.
custody arrangement or access
shall

be

as

described

and

The joint physical

schedule for Nicholas and Zachary
set

forth

in

the Access

Schedule

recommendation of Dr. Jill D. Sanders at pages 12-13, paragraphs
numbered 2, 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d, of the Child Custody Evaluation, as
follows:
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2.
Access schedule.
Regardless of whether this
"extended family" lives in Salt Lake City or in Oregon
the following schedule is recommended.
However, my
strong recommendation is that Kelly relocate to Oregon so
that Nicholas can begin the second school term in Oregon:
a.
Continuation of the present seven day/seven day
rotation. The children have been on this schedule since
September and appear to be able to tolerate the amount of
time away from the other parent.
b.
During the summer months Kimberlee/Peter and
Kelly would have the option of a ten-day period of
uninterrupted access to both boys. Kelly will have the
first choice of that period in even years and
Kimberlee/Peter will have the first choice in odd years.
These periods may not be combined with regular access to
form a block longer than ten days.
c.
Beginning in the school year of 2004/2005
Nicholas
will
continue
on the weekly rotation.
Transitions would occur Sunday evening.
Zachary will
spend five nights with Kelly and either return to
Kimberlee/Peter for the last two nights of the seven-day
period or remain with them for the first two nights of
Kelly's period (rotating each time). Nicholas would join
Zachary at Kimberlee/Peter' s on Sunday for his continuous
seven-day period in that home. This arrangement keeps
the boys on a highly predictable schedule, allows them to
spend the vast majority of their time together, allows
each of them some time alone with their biological
fathers, and coincides with Peter's greater availability
on the weekends.
d.
Holidays may be rotated according to Utah
guidelines, or according to mutual agreement, with only
major holidays being included (i.e. UEA, Thanksgiving,
Christmas, Spring Break, July 4th) .
48.

For purposes of transportation, each party should be

responsible for picking up the children at the beginning of that
parent's access
49.

It is reasonable and in the best interest of Zachary that

his surname be changed to "Thanos."

It is reasonable that an

QLM?\
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explanation regarding the circumstances of each child's conception,
birth and circumstances be crafted with the help of Dr. Jay Thomas
and that it be provided to the boys in a unified manner.

It is in

their best interest that the boys hear a consistent presentation
regarding these issues.
50.

It is reasonable that the petitioner, respondent and

intervenor be able to attend events for both boys and any of the
three parties should be permitted to perform volunteer work in
either of the boys' school classrooms.
51.

In the event that the parties are unable to facilitate a

parenting plan or in the event
an impasse regarding major

that petitioner and Thanoses reach

issues concerning the boys,

it is

reasonable that a parenting coordinator be utilized to facilitate
resolution of parenting disagreements.

Each party should pay one-

half of the cost of that coordinator.
Child Support
52.
per month.

The intervener's income is approximately $11,747 gross
Petitioner's gross monthly income is $7,750 per month.

Respondent's monthly gross income is $7,440. The combined adjusted
gross incomes of petitioner and respondent exceeds the guidelines,
therefore, the amount of child support is determined on a case by
case basis and the Court must determine what is reasonable.
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gross monthly incomes of petitioner and

respondent are substantially the same.

The standard of living

currently enjoyed by petitioner and respondent is consistent with
that which was enjoyed during the course of petitioner's and
respondent's marriage, except currently respondent benefits from
the income and earning capacity of intervenor.
respondent's

earning

capacity

is

similar

Petitioner and

based

upon

their

education, training and work experience. There is a seven year age
difference between petitioner and respondent which does not impact
their respective incomes or earning capacity. Based upon the joint
physical custody arrangement or access schedule as to Nicholas,
petitioner will have 182 overnights and respondent will have 183
overnights,
petitioner

or vice
and

versa.

respondent

Based
each

upon

have

the

foregoing,

adequate

resources

both
to

adequately support Nicholas without child support from the other.
Therefore, zero child support is awarded for either petitioner or
respondent regarding Nicholas, which is reasonable under the facts
set forth hereinbefore.

Respondent and intervenor have agreed or

the Court finds that petitioner should not be required to pay child
support for Zachary.
support is denied.

Petitioner's claim for retroactive child
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Medical, Dental Insurance/Daycare
54.

Through their employment the Thanoses are capable of

obtaining medical and dental insurance for Nicholas and Zachary.
They should be required to obtain such insurance.

The Thanoses

have agreed to pay all insurance expenses for Zachary.

Petitioner

should be ordered to reimburse them for one-half of the cost of
obtaining such medical and dental insurance for Nicholas.

The

Thanoses should be ordered to provide petitioner with documentary
proof that they have obtained medical and dental insurance coverage
for Nicholas.

Petitioner should be ordered to pay his one-half

share of the premium for Nicholas' medical and dental insurance on
the 5th day of each month beginning with the first month following
his receipt from Thanoses of confirmation of the said medical and
dental insurance coverage.
55.

Neither petitioner nor the Thanoses should be required to

pay any daycare

expenses

incurred by the other party

in the

providing of care for the boys.
56.

Petitioner should be required to pay one-half of all

medical or dental insurance co-pays or deductibles and one-half of
all dental and medical expenses incurred by either petitioner or
the Thanoses on behalf of or for the benefit of Nicholas.
Thanoses have agreed to pay all such expenses and all school

The
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expenses incurred on behalf or for the benefit of Zachary.

It is

reasonable that they be required to pay all of such expenses.
Alimony
57.

For

the

following

reasons

neither

petitioner

or

respondent should be awarded alimony:
a.

The

financial

respondent are similar.

conditions

of

petitioner

and

The standards of living of petitioner and

respondent as of the date of their separation has not changed
significantly. Neither will be required to accept a lower standard
of living if he or she does not receive alimony from the other.
b.
identical.

The incomes of petitioner and respondent are nearly
Each has the ability to produce significant income in

the future.
c.

Neither

petitioner

nor

respondent

directly

contributed to any increase in the skill or earning capacity of the
other during their marriage.
d.
contributing

Although respondent's affair with intervenor was a
cause

of

the

disintegration

of

the

marriage

of

petitioner and respondent, the ultimate cause of the termination of
their marriage was their irreconcilable differences.

The parties

made a good faith effort to reconcile after respondent's affair
with intervenor became known to petitioner. The Court is therefore
of the view that fault should not be considered in the awarding of
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As is often the case in marital relationships, the Court

petitioner

and

respondent

both

responsible

for

the

irreconcilable differences that ended their marriage.
58.

Petitioner and respondent have executed and filed with

this Court a Stipulation which resolves all remaining differences
between them concerning the division of their marital property.
The Stipulation is reasonable and should be incorporated into this
Courtf s Decree of Divorce.
Contempt/Work-Related Child Care Expenses
59.

By a motion for an Order to Show Cause dated November 13,

2003, petitioner asked this Court to hold respondent in contempt
for her failure to reimburse him for certain expenses which he had
incurred on behalf of Nicholas and Zachary.

The motion was based

upon an interim order entered by this Court on March 28, 2001,
which required the parties equally to divide expenses related to
the rearing of the boys.

Following a hearing before Commissioner

Michael S. Evans on January 22, 2004, the Commissioner recommended
that respondent be held in contempt for her failure to reimburse
petitioner and that this Court enter a judgment against respondent
in the approximate sum of $12,000.
recommendation.

Respondent objected to that

This Court determined that respondent's objection

to the Commissioner's recommendation be heard at the trial of this
matter.

60.
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At the time of trial petitioner and respondent informed

the Court that they had reached an agreement with regard to the
sums which each had paid before the trial for medical insurance and
uninsured medical expenses.

The parties stipulated that in the

Decree the Court should award petitioner the sum of $1,911.41
representing net expenditures by petitioner for medical insurance
premiums and uninsured medical expenses after offsetting payments
made by respondent for those categories of expenses.
61.

Petitioner

and

respondent

were

unable

to

reach

an

agreement concerning work-related childcare expenses incurred by
each of

them.

The

Court

received

evidence

concerning

those

expenses and determined that prior to trial petitioner had incurred
work-related childcare expenses of $8,811.20 and respondent had
incurred work-related childcare expenses of $2,315.00.
amount owing to petitioner is therefore $6,496.20.

The net

The Decree of

Divorce should award petitioner that amount for pretrial workrelated childcare expenses.
62.

There

is

no

evidence

violated the interim order.

that

respondent

deliberately

At the time the Order to Show Cause

was issued petitioner and respondent were communicating about the
sums which

each

had

expended

for

the boys.

Respondent

had

requested additional financial information which petitioner had not
provided.

Respondent had potential offsets which she had not yet
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circumstances,

holding

respondent in contempt would be inappropriate.
Attorney's Fees
63.

The attorney fees incurred by petitioner, respondent and

intervenor are substantial and comparable in amount.

Each party

has the ability to pay their respective attorney fees based upon
their annual incomes.

Additionally, in a case of this nature and

complexity, determining who is the prevailing party is next to
impossible.

Therefore,

responsibility

for

their

each

party

respective

is

required

attorney

to

fees

assume
without

contribution.
Transition
64.

The

fifty/fifty

shared

temporary

custody

arrangement

shall continue until petitioner's anticipated relocation to Oregon.
It is in the best interests of the minor children that petitioner,
respondent and intervenor relocate to Oregon simultaneously in
order to reduce any period of separation necessitated by the
transition.

In any event, respondent and intervener's relocation

to Oregon must occur prior to Nicholas starting the school term in
Oregon.
Based upon the preceding Findings of Fact, the Court now
enters its:

PEARSON V. PEARSON

FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

PAGE 35
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Petitioner and respondent are awarded joint legal custody

of Nicholas.

Respondent and intervenor are awarded joint legal

custody of Zachary as further described in the Court's Findings.
2.

Respondent is designated the primary physical custodian

of Nicholas.

Respondent and intervenor are designated the primary

physical custodians of Zachary.
3.

Petitioner should be awarded joint physical custody time

with Nicholas and Zachary in the manner described in the Court's
Findings.
4.
one-half

Petitioner and respondent should be ordered each to pay
of

Nicholas1

uninsured

medical

and

dental

insurance

premiums, co-pays and deductibles and one-half of the cost of
health and dental insurance for him.

Respondent and intervenor

should be ordered to pay all such expenses of Zachary.
5.

None of the parties should be ordered to pay alimony or

for the cost of work-related childcare.
6.

Respondent should be ordered to pay petitioner the sum of

$6,496.20 as reimbursement for expenses incurred by him on behalf
of Nicholas and Zachary for work-related childcare prior to the
date of trial.

7.

The property
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of petitioner and respondent

should be

divided according to the division described in their Stipulation
for Property Division dated December 10, 2003.
8.

Respondent should not be held in contempt for failure to

reimburse petitioner for childcare and medical expenses he incurred
prior to November 13, 2003.
9.

The parties are ordered to share in thirds equally the

costs of Dr. Sanders1 custody evaluation.
10.

Counsel for respondent and intervenor are instructed to

submit a Decree consistent with the Court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the
following, this

(1 day of May, 2004:

Paige Bigelow— ftaWctal \VMW /<P(
Attorney for Petitioner
50 West Broadway, 8th Floor
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